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Abstract 
The objective of this thesis is to address the reconciliation problem in Sri Lanka. It 
addresses two research questions: (a) whether the transitional justice mechanism proposed 
by the international community can help build reconciliation in Sri Lanka? and (b) what 
alternative mechanisms can be implemented in support of these mechanisms to reconcile the 
divided communities? Sri Lanka ended 30 years of civil war in 2009. However, a successful 
reconciliation mechanism has not yet been implemented. Currently, Sri Lanka experiences 
significant ethnic division and this may lead to the recurrence of the civil war. The 
international community proposed the implementation of mechanisms for reconciliation 
including truth commissions and hybrid courts. The thesis argues that these classical 
mechanisms, even though useful, are not sufficient. Hence, an additional mechanism is 
required to address the Sri Lankan reconciliation problem. 
To address the identified research questions, this thesis uses three main concepts: 
Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL), structural violence and the capabilities 
approach. TWAIL demonstrates that the third world people’s perspective must be 
represented in the reconciliation mechanisms. From a third world people’s perspective, 
increased structural violence as a result of the civil war is the key factor that prevents 
reconciliation. This thesis defines structural violence as the violence arising out of particular 
social or institutional structures, which results in providing privileges to one communal group 
to the detriment of others, creating antipathy within the disadvantaged group. The thesis 
argues that any mechanism for reconciliation should address the problem of increased 
structural violence. To address increased structural violence, the thesis suggests the use of 
the capabilities approach as developed by Amartya Sen. 
The capabilities approach is designed to enhance wellbeing and the quality of life by 
considering the opportunities of the people, individual abilities, available resources and 
personal values. It suggests that the victims of the civil war should be included in domestic 
political and economic mechanisms. The current Sri Lankan political situation does not allow 
minority groups, such as the Tamils, to effectively participate in politics. One way of 
addressing this problem is the implementation of an effective power sharing mechanism. The 
v 
thesis introduces three reform proposals: (a) to elect a Governor from each Provincial Council; 
(b) to implement national government consultative committees and (c) to implement a
permanent minority seat to represent the Tamils in the government.
The thesis argues that as a result of the civil war structural violence in economic terms 
has increased. To address this problem the thesis introduces reform proposals to ensure war- 
victims’ inclusion in the economic process by: (a) enacting anti-discrimination laws (b) 
reducing the number of military personnel from the North and the East (c) developing the 
capabilities and skills of the individuals and (d) allowing suitable credit facilities. These reform 
proposals explicitly address the key factors that restrict minority Tamils’ inclusion in the 
domestic economy. These proposals come within the capabilities approach which focuses on 
enhancing the wellbeing and quality of life of the people. 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
Executive summary 
Sri Lanka ended 30 years of civil war in 2009.1 The main cause of this civil war was 
the ethnic tension between the Sinhalese and Tamils.2 Currently, ethnic tension continues in 
Sri Lanka.3 Ethnic groups are not reconciled, and an effective transitional justice mechanism 
has not been implemented. The current situation may lead to the recurrence of the civil 
war. The international community made several attempts and suggested several means to 
reconcile the parties.4 Despite these attempts, Sri Lanka shows little progress in reconciling 
the divided communities.5 To date, a number of regional human rights mechanisms have 
been established including the African Union,6 the European Court of Human Rights,7 and 
the inter-American human rights system.8 While South East Asian countries have adopted a 
human rights declaration, a regional human rights mechanism has not been established in 
other parts of Asia and the Pacific.9 Intervention under the umbrella of regional human 
rights mechanisms can reduce the risk of human rights violations in conflicts. For instance, 
the threat to human rights posed by the Senegalese civil war in the 1980s was limited by the 
intervention of the African Union.10 Unlike Senegal, Sri Lanka is not a party to a regional 
human rights mechanism and therefore no regional partners intervened to prevent human 
rights violations during the decades of the civil war.  
1 Miguel Candela Zigor Aldama, The Scars of Sri Lanka’s civil war, (6th June 2016) Al Jazeera < 
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/inpictures/2015/12/scars-sri-lanka-civil-war-151221062101569.html>. 
2 Council on Foreign Relations, The Sri Lankan Conflict (15th September 2018) Council on Foreign Relations, < 
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/sri-lankan-conflict>. 
3 Chapter 1 page 4 of this thesis makes a comprehensive analysis of this claim. 
4 Since 2009 until 2015 the international community made several attempts to implement a transitional justice 
mechanism. However, the Sri Lankan government did not positively respond to these proposals. A 
comprehensive analysis of this claim is made at page 5 of this chapter. 
5 The Indian Express, UN rapporteur unhappy over Sri Lanka’s reconciliation progress, (15th September 2018) 
The Indian Express <https://indianexpress.com/article/world/un-rapporteur-unhappy-over-sri-lankas-
reconciliation-progress-4751007/>. 
6 Article 18, Constitutive Act of the African Union, (entered into force 11 July 2000). 
7 Section 3, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950 as amended by 
Protocols No. 11 and No. 14, ETS No 5, (entered into force 1 June 2010). 
8 Charter of the Organization of American States 1967, Chapter IV. 
9 Silvia Atanassova Croydon, ‘Towards a regional human rights mechanism in the Asia Pacific? Exploring the 
potential of the Asia Pacific Forum’ (2014) 27 (2), The Pacific Review 289, 290. 
10 Charles Chernor Jalloh, The Sierra Leone Special Court and Its Legacy: The Impact for Africa and International 
Criminal Law, (Cambridge University Press, 1st ed, 2013) 8. 
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This thesis questions whether the classical legal framework for reconciliation11 can 
adequately address the Sri Lankan problem and examines an alternative solution to 
supplement the classical mechanisms. It will be shown that, even though the classical 
mechanisms are essential for reconciliation, these mechanisms are not sufficient. In the 
absence of a regional human rights mechanism this is an essential step. 
 
This chapter will first introduce the Sri Lankan case study. Next, it will introduce the 
research question and justify the rationale for this research. This chapter will also briefly 
describe the classical transitional justice mechanisms and will define the term reconciliation. 
Next, this chapter will introduce the main concepts used in the thesis, namely, Third World 
Approaches to International Law (TWAIL), structural violence and the capabilities approach. 
After explaining this conceptual framework, the chapter will introduce the methodology 
utilised in this research project. The chapter will end with a brief conclusion. 
 
1.1 Background to the study  
The population of Sri Lanka has always been heterogeneous12 with principal divisions 
between Sinhalese, Tamil and Muslim.13 The ethnic division is intensified by the Sinhalese 
Buddhist claim that they are the earliest settlers of Sri Lanka. Despite this multi-ethnic 
background, Buddhism remains the main religion in Sri Lanka and is constitutionally 
 
11 For the purpose of this research the classical legal framework for reconciliation is defined as the transitional 
justice mechanisms developed by the international community to reconcile divided communities in the past. 
This includes hybrid courts, truth commissions and reparation programs. (See, United Nations Human Rights 
Office of the High Commissioner, Transitional Justice and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (United Nations 
Publication 1st ed, 2014) 1-8. 
12 Deborah Winslow and Michael D Woost, Economy Culture and Civil War in Sri Lanka (Indiana University 
Press, 1st edition, 2004) 4. 
13 When the British ruled Sri Lanka, (1815 – 1948) the population was classified into three races: the Sinhalese, 
the Tamils and the Muslims and considered them to be fixed entities.( S.I. Keethaponcalan, Conflict and peace 
in Sri Lanka: Major Documents with and introductory Note on each Document (Kumaran Book House, 1st ed, 
2009) and  Sehar Mushtaq, ‘Identity Conflict in Sri Lanka: A Case of Tamil Tigers’ (2012) 2 (15), International 
Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences, 202)  These races had their own quasi biological differences in terms 
of their culture, aptitudes, character and appearance. The significant caste differences which were rooted into 
the Sri Lankan pre-British society was uprooted by the British. Instead of the caste, the British gave significance 
to the language. As a result, the division between the Tamils and the Sinhalese was heightened. The Muslims, 
who share similar language with the Tamil, also play a significant role in the Sri Lankan politics. Due to this 
division of population in terms of ethnicity, it has become apparent that a reconciliation mechanism should 
necessarily deal with the ethnic division and their specific socio-cultural factors. 
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protected.14 While equality of religion is ensured by the constitution this privilege has not 
been given to any other religion.15 
Tamil minority groups experienced discrimination, violence and tension for decades 
prior to the start of the civil war in the late 1970s.16 Amongst many, three main events 
resulted in the damaged relationships between the Tamil and Sinhalese people: (a) enacting 
the Official Language Act in 1956, (b) constitutional primacy given to Buddhism and the 
Sinhalese language by the 1972 First Republican Constitution, and (c) youth unrest in 1978. 
 
The Official Languages Act of 1956 played a major role in the socio-cultural events in 
Sri Lanka that lead to the emergence of a violent civil war.17 Hence, it is worthwhile looking 
at the background that led to the enactment of this legislation. After colonisation, the 
British implemented English as the main working language in Sri Lanka.18 At the time, both 
the Tamil and Sinhalese leaders negotiated with the British to impose Sinhalese and Tamil as 
working languages.19 In 1945, three years before independence, JR Jayawardena, a member 
of the State Council proposed to recognise both Tamil and Sinhalese as national languages 
in Sri Lanka.20 This was opposed by other Sinhalese politicians.21 After independence, the 
official language issue was used by the newly established Sri Lanka Freedom Party as a tool 
to win the majority Sinhalese votes. For instance, S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, leader of the party 
in 1956 claimed that, “the Tamils with their much more developed culture will dominate us. 
 
14 Article 9 of the 1978 Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka provides: “The Republic of 
Sri Lanka shall give to Buddhism the foremost place and accordingly it shall be the duty of the State to protect 
and foster the Buddha Sasana, while assuring to all religions the rights granted by Articles 10 and 14(1)(e).” 
15 Article 10 of the 1978 Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka provides: “Every person 
is entitled to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, including the freedom to have or to adopt a religion 
or belief of his choice”. 
16 Johan Galtung, ‘Power Sharing as Peace Structure: The Case of Sri Lanka’ (Working Paper No. 2, Institute for 
Integrative Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding 2005) 6; Mathijs van Leeuwen, Partners in Peace – 
Discourses and Practices of Civil Society Peacebuilding (Ashgate Publishing Limited, 1st edition 2009). 
17 Neil Devotta, ‘From Ethnic Outbidding to Ethnic Conflict: the Institutional Bases for Sri Lanka’s Separatist 
War’ (2005) 11(1) Journal of Nations and Nationalism, 141, 149, Sandagomi Coperahewa, ‘The Language 
Planning Situation in Sri Lanka’ (2009) 10 (1) Current Issues in Language Planning 69, 111, David Hayes, ‘Duty 
and Service: Life and Career of a Tamil Teacher of English in Sri Lanka’ (2010) 44 (1), TESOL Quarterly, 60. 
18 Janina Brutt-Griffler, ‘Class, Ethnicity, and Language Rights: An Analysis of British Colonial Policy in Lesotho 
and Sri Lanka and Some Implications for Language Policy’ (2002) 1(3), Journal of Language, Identity, and 
Education, 207, 230. 
19 Sandagomi Coperahewa, ‘The Language Planning Situation in Sri Lanka’ (2009) 10 (1) Current Issues in 
Language Planning 69, 79-80. 
20 Ibid, 111. 
21 Ibid, 79. 
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Tamil even as a regional language is not desirable as Tamils are insatiable and they will not 
rest until the whole of Ceylon is given parity.”22 
In 1956, Premier Bandaranaike enacted the Official Languages Act making Sinhalese 
the official language in Sri Lanka. This marked the beginning of official discrimination against 
the minority Tamils by the majority Sinhalese.23 As part of the process, several 
discriminatory administrative decisions were made by the Premier. For instance, 
Bandaranaike’s Cabinet categorized public servants as old entrants and new entrants. It was 
mandatory for the new entrants to pass a proficiency test in Sinhala.24 This was clearly 
aimed to limit the number of Tamils in the Sri Lankan public service.25 This was later 
followed by several other decisions that restricted the rights and privileges of minority 
Tamils including publishing the government Gazette in Sinhala, issuing the departmental 
circulars in Sinhala and franking the official letters in Sinhala. 26  
Minority Tamils were shocked and demanded to end these discriminatory practices. 
In order to control the Tamil uprisings, Bandaranaike enacted the Tamil Language (Special 
Provisions) Act in 1958 declaring Tamil language as an official language in the North and the 
East where the majority of Tamil speakers were living.27 As a reaction to this initiative, 
Bandaranaike was killed by a Buddhist monk in 1959.28   
These discriminatory actions led to the violence between Sinhalese and Tamils that 
ultimately resulted in a lengthy civil war. Civilians belonging to every ethnicity suffered from 
the Sri Lankan civil war. News reports indicate that nearly 100,000 people were killed as a 
result of the civil war.29 These reports indicate that the impact of the last few months of the 
civil war (March to May 2009) was severe. During this period approximately 40,000 Tamil 
 
22 Ibid. 
23 Sabina Martyn, ‘In Post-Conflict Sri Lanka, Language is Essential for Reconciliation” The Asia Foundation, 
<https://asiafoundation.org/2013/01/16/in-post-conflict-sri-lanka-language-is-essential-for-reconciliation/.> 
24 Sandagomi Coperahewa, above n 19.  
25 Ibid. 
26  Sabina Martyn, above n 23. 
27 Ibid.  
28 Janaka Perera, “Assassination of a Prime Minister – S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike”, Asian Tribune, (16/01/2013) 
https://asiafoundation.org/2013/01/16/in-post-conflict-sri-lanka-language-is-essential-for-reconciliation/.  
29 Al Jazeera, Sri Lanka starts count of civil war dead (28th November 2013) Al Jazeera America < 
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/11/28/sri-lanka-startscountingthecivilwardead.html> and 
AFP, Sri Lanka civil war: Reconciliation efforts slammed on anniversary of seven-year conflict (18th May 2016) 
ABC News < http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-05-18/sri-lanka-reconciliation-effort-slammed-on-war-
anniversary/7425636>.  
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civilians were killed.30 Both the Sri Lankan government and international community sought 
to address this problem diplomatically. Ceasefire agreements implemented in 2001 and 
2002 failed and the war continued until the defeat of the Tamil Tigers in May 2009.  
When armed violence ended in 2009, Sri Lanka entered the post-conflict phase with 
the central challenge of reconciling the divided parties. For eight years, Sri Lanka struggled 
in this mission but until now ethnic tension is high, and parties have not been reconciled.31 
The conduct of the previous Sinhalese majority government (2005-2015) showed its 
reluctance to accept the Tamil minority.32 The victory parades displayed largely Sinhalese 
military against the Tamils.33 Tamils were also banned from commemorating rebels who 
died in the conflict.34 The new government which came to power in 2015, following 
pressure from the international community, allowed such commemorations with some 
restrictions.35 However, post-conflict ethnic tension continues in Sri Lanka. For instance, in 
April 2012, hard-line Buddhists who were followed by Buddhist monks attacked a Hindu 
Temple in Dambulla demanding the site to be demolished.36 Also, Kumar -a Sri Lankan Tamil 
who sought refugee status in Australia, in his visit to Sri Lanka experienced severe torture 
and violence by the Sinhalese military forces.37 It is reported that he was beaten heavily – 
his back was beaten ‘with a scalding bar’.38 Several similar claims were made throughout the 
post-conflict years.39 Tamils also continued to live under majority Sinhalese dominance.40 
For this reason, in post-conflict Sri Lanka, Tamils live in fear and despair.  
 
30 Ibid. 
31 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, Sri Lanka: slow progress on crucial justice 
and reconciliation – UN report, United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner < 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21278&LangID=E> 
32 AFP, Sri Lanka civil war: Reconciliation efforts slammed on anniversary of seven-year conflict (18th May 2016) 
ABC News < http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-05-18/sri-lanka-reconciliation-effort-slammed-on-war-
anniversary/7425636>. 
33 AFP, Sri Lanka civil war: Reconciliation efforts slammed on anniversary of seven-year conflict (18th May 2016) 
ABC News < http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-05-18/sri-lanka-reconciliation-effort-slammed-on-war-
anniversary/7425636>. 
34 Shihar Aneez and Ranga Srilal, Tamils say barred from commemorating war dead, Sri Lanka denies (19th May 
2014) Reuters < https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sri-lanka-war-celebrations-idUSBREA4H09B20140518>. 
35 Quintus Colombage and Niranjani Roland, Sri Lanka Tamils openly remember war dead- with restrictions 
(19th May 2015) UCA News < https://www.ucanews.com/news/sri-lanka-tamils-openly-remember-war-dead-
with-restrictions/73614>. 
36 BBC News, Sri Lankan Muslims strike over Dambulla mosque (26th April 2012) BBC News < 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-17852900>. 
37 Michael Gordon, Scarred by Sri Lankan torture (24th April 2013) Sydney Morning Herald, < 
https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/scarred-by-sri-lankan-torture-20130424-2if16.html>. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
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Communal violence against Muslims has also continued in the post-conflict Sri 
Lankan society. For instance, in January 2013, hard-line Buddhist monks attacked a Muslim-
owned slaughterhouse.41 In June 2014, Buddhists attacked Muslims in Aluthgama killing at 
least three Muslims and leaving more than 78 seriously injured.42 The most serious event, 
the Kandy incident, happened in March 2018. Several riots and arson attacks took place in 
this area causing deaths and injuries. A curfew was imposed,43 and a state of emergency 
was declared for the first time after the end of the civil war in Sri Lanka.44  
Social media posts and personal communications to the author demonstrate that the 
ethnic tension in Sri Lankan society is comparatively high. The above situations indicate that 
the Sri Lankan Muslims who did not take part in the decade-long civil war are now party to 
the ethnic tension. Hence, different ethnic communities live in fear and despair.45 As a 
result, the current situation in Sri Lanka could lead to a resumption of the civil war. This 
situation emphasizes the importance of introducing a successful reconciliation mechanism. 
1.2 Research Question 
The international community made several attempts to implement a reconciliation 
mechanism in Sri Lanka. The umbrella institutions of the United Nations, including the 
Security Council, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) proposed several mechanisms in support of the 
reconciliation in Sri Lanka. States from the West made recommendations in support of the 
Sri Lankan reconciliation process. For instance, immediately after the end of the civil war in 
2009, Stephen Rapp – The State Department of the United States’ top war crimes official - 
urged the Sri Lankan government to conduct a genuine investigation against the alleged war 
 
40 Shreerupa Mitra-Jha, Tamils continue to face racial discrimination in Sri Lanka, says UN Committee post 
review (25th August 2016) First post < https://www.firstpost.com/world/tamils-continue-to-face-racial-
discrimination-in-sri-lanka-says-un-committee-post-review-2976326.html>. 
41 BBC News, The hardline Buddhists targeting Sri Lanka’s Muslims (25th March 2013) BBC News < 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-21840600>. 
42 BBC News, Sri Lanka Muslims killed in Aluthgama clashes with Buddhists (16th June 2014) BBC News < 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-27864716>. 
43 Al Jazeera, Sri Lanka: Police inaction as Muslim shops torched by Buddhists (6th March 2018) Al Jazeera News 
Asia < https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/03/sri-lanka-muslim-shops-mosques-targeted-buddhist-
hardliners-180305165900594.html>. 
44 Meenakshi Ganguli, State of Emergency Declared in Sri Lanka – Violence by anti Muslim mobs highlights 
interethnic strife (7th March 2018) Human Rights Watch < https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/03/07/state-
emergency-declared-sri-lanka>. 
45 BBC News, above n 33. 
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crimes in Sri Lanka.46 In 2012 the United Nations Human Rights Council adopted a resolution 
urging the Sri Lankan government to investigate the deaths of civilians during the final 
phase of the civil war.47 In 2014, the UN Human Rights Council adopted Resolution 25/1, 
requesting the High Commissioner of the UN Human Rights to “undertake a comprehensive 
investigation into alleged serious violations and abuses of human rights.”48 In 2015 the 
United Nations issued the Report of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR) Investigation on Sri Lanka urging the government to implement an international 
criminal tribunal, truth-seeking, reparations programs and institutional reforms.49 
Many of these resolutions required the implementation of a classical transitional 
justice mechanism, with particular focus on an international criminal tribunal.50 However, 
the Sri Lankan government did not support this proposal.51 For instance, President 
Rajapakse in 2013 at the Commonwealth Summit declared that Sri Lanka has its own judicial 
mechanism to investigate the crimes.52  Yet, the Sri Lankan legal framework has no 
provisions for war crimes or crimes against humanity.53 Very few alleged perpetrators were 
charged under the domestic legal framework, and those charges had no relationship to war 
crimes. For instance, in August 2018, the magistrate court in Colombo ordered the arrest of 
Admiral Ravindra Wijegunaratne, chief defence staff, for the alleged role played in the 
abduction and murder of 11 Tamil children from rich Tamil families.54 These children were 
kidnapped between 2008 and 2009, allegedly by Sri Lanka Navy, whose bodies were never 
 
46 Colum Lynchm US urges Sri Lanka to probe alleged war crimes by government, rebels (23rd October 2009) 
Washington Post<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/10/22/AR2009102204674.html?noredirect=on>. 
47 Nick Cumming-Bruce, In Resolution, UN Council Presses Sri Lanka on Civilian Deaths (22nd March 2012) New 
York Times <https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/23/world/asia/rights-body-passes-measure-on-sri-
lanka.html>. 
48 A/HRC/30/CRP.2 Report of the OHCHR Investigation on Sri Lanka, Human Rights Council 30th session, Agenda 
item 2. 
49 Ibid. 
50 The Guardian, UN calls for Sri Lanka war crimes court to investigate atrocities (16th September 2015) The 
Guardian < https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/16/un-seeks-special-court-to-investigate-sri-lanka-
war-atrocities>. 
51 Ana Pararajasingham, Why is Sri Lanka Defying the United Nations (22nd December 2017) The Diplomat < 
https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/why-is-sri-lanka-defying-the-united-nations/>.  
52 Christian Otton, Sri Lanka has nothing to hide, says President Mahinda Rajapakse (14th November 2013) The 
Sydney Morning Herald < https://www.smh.com.au/world/sri-lanka-has-nothing-to-hide-says-president-
mahinda-rajapakse-20131114-2xk0i.html>. 
53 https://www.ft.com/content/2c1c1d84-5c50-11e5-97e9-7f0bf5e7177b (no details). 
54 Economy Next, Court orders arrest of Sri Lanka’s top military commander, (29th August 2018) Economy Next, 
< https://economynext.com/Court_orders_arrest_of_Sri_Lanka’s_top_military_commander-3-11703.html>. 
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found.55 Previously in 2017, Commodore D.K.P. Dassanayake, former Navy spokesman, was 
arrested and bailed for the same offence.56 
 In September 2015, President Rajapakse requested the current government to 
reject the Report of the OHCHR57 investigation on Sri Lanka.58 In 2017, President Sirisena 
declared that he is opposed to any international involvement in the transitional justice 
mechanism.59 Very recently, in late September 2018, President Sirisena in his address to the 
UN General Assembly declared that, “We do not want any foreign power to exert influence 
on us… I urge the international community to allow Sri Lankan people to solve their 
problems on their own.”60 This situation represents a deadlock between the international 
community and the Sri Lankan government. 
This thesis examines two interrelated research questions: (a) whether the classical 
transitional justice mechanism proposed by the international community can help build 
reconciliation in Sri Lanka? and (b) what alternative mechanism can be implemented in 
support of the classical mechanisms to reconcile the divided communities in Sri Lanka? By 
answering these two questions, this thesis aims to suggest a successful reconciliation 
mechanism for Sri Lanka, to supplement the classical transitional justice mechanism 
demanded by the international community. In that way, this thesis aims to demonstrate 
how a successful reconciliation mechanism can be implemented in a Third World country. 
The thesis specifically will: 
1. examine the central problems that restricts reconciliation in a Third World state; 
2. examine the extent to which the current approach of international law facilitates 
a successful reconciliation process in post-conflict Third World states; 
 
55 AFP, Arrest of Sri Lanka’s top military officer ordered (30th August 2018) Dawn News, < 
https://www.dawn.com/news/1429856>. 
56 Colombo Gazette, Former Navy spokesman D.K.P. Dassanayake granted bail (9ty January 2018) Colombo 
Gazette < http://colombogazette.com/2018/01/09/former-navy-spokesman-d-k-p-dassanayake-granted-
bail/>. 
57 A/HRC/30/CRP.2 Report of the OHCHR Investigation on Sri Lanka, Human Rights Council 30th session, Agenda 
item 2. 
58Shihar Aneez and Ranga Srilal, Rajapakse criticizes UN findings on Sri Lanka war crimes, (23rd September 
2015) Reuters < https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sri-lanka-rights/rajapaksa-criticizes-u-n-findings-on-sri-
lanka-war-crimes-idUSKCN0RM23J20150922>. 
59 Shihar Aneez, Sri Lanka divided as panel backs foreign judges to probe war crimes (6th January 2017) Reuters 
< https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sri-lanka-rights-un/sri-lanka-divided-as-panel-backs-foreign-judges-to-
probe-war-crimes-idUSKBN14P2CP>. 
60 Daily Mirror, no need of foreign interference: allow us to solve our problems-MS (26th September 2018) Daily 
Mirror. Shihar Aneez, Sri Lanka divided as panel backs foreign judges to probe war crimes (6th January 2017) 
Reuters < https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sri-lanka-rights-un/sri-lanka-divided-as-panel-backs-foreign-
judges-to-probe-war-crimes-idUSKBN14P2CP>. 
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3. highlight and discuss the elements (as solutions) that will address the identified 
central problem of reconciliation in post-conflict Sri Lanka; and 
4. apply the identified research contributions to the Sri Lankan case study to 
recommend the best method of successful post-conflict reconciliation 
mechanism in Sri Lanka. 
Now this chapter turns to introduce the notion of transitional justice as it has been 
recognised by the international community. 
 
1.3 The notion of transitional justice 
Transitional justice mechanisms attempt to provide justice to the victims of 
systematic violations of human rights and other abuses of past conflicts. 61  The systematic 
abuses of past conflicts in certain Latin American and Eastern European states during 1980s 
and 1990s, including Argentina, Chile, Guatemala, Bosnia and Herzegovina and South Africa 
led to the beginning of this concept.62 At the time, these states were undergoing various 
levels of political transition, but victims of abuses demanded justice.63 To allow political 
transition and to serve justice, the concept of transitional justice was introduced.  
There are two major goals of transitional justice: (a) providing justice to victims and 
(b) reinforcing possibilities for peace, democracy and reconciliation.64 The first aim, 
providing justice to victims is a retributive form of justice. 65 Retributive justice intends to 
punish the perpetrators through a criminal justice system.66 Contrastingly, the second aim 
comes under the restorative form of justice67 which focuses on healing the relationships.68 
To achieve either of these aims, the first step is political transition. When political transition 
has taken place, it becomes possible to work towards providing for the twin goals of 
transitional justice: justice to victims and reinforcing peace, democracy and reconciliation. 
 
61 The-United-Nations, 'What is Transitional Justice? A Backgrounder' (United Nations Documents, 2008) 
62 Lara Waldorf, ‘Anticipating the past: Transitional justice and socio-economic wrongs’ (2012) 21 (2), Journal 
of Socio and Legal Studies, 177. 
63 Ibid. 
64 David Bloomfield, Teresa Barnes and Luc Huyse, ‘Reconciliation after Violent Conflict: A Handbook’ 
(Handbook Series, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 2003); Harsh Mander, Fear 
and Forgiveness – The Aftermath of Massacre (Penguin Books, 1st edition 2009). 
65 Nina Gulzari, Implementing Transitional Justice: A Study of South Africa and Bosnia and Herzegovina on the 
Relevance of Context, (Master’s thesis, November 2017). 
66 Koodoruth Ibrahim, the Blending of Retributive and the Restorative Justice Approaches to Combat Domestic 
Violence: The Case of Mauritius, (2013) 3 (18), International Journal of Humanities and Social Science 69. 
67 Ibid 70. 
68 Ibid. 
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In a Sri Lankan context, the 2015 presidential election made some political transition in the 
country.69 The decade long Rajapakse regime, which ended the civil war and who is largely 
accused of war crimes, lost power in this election. Now, Sri Lanka needs to concentrate on 
the second stage for reconciliation.  
The objective of this thesis, relates to the transitional justice goal of healing 
relationships. More specifically, the thesis aims to identify the possibilities for effective 
reconciliation in Sri Lanka. However, it is essential to note that any individual’s commission 
of war crimes like murder and crimes against humanity cannot be dealt with by amnesties 
and pardons.70 Perpetrators of war crimes must be dealt with through a retributive justice 
mechanism. For this reason, this thesis does not propose a mechanism to replace the 
classical mechanisms for reconciliation. Rather, this thesis proposes to establish an 
additional mechanism to support the retributive justice mechanism (classical). The 
additional mechanism should address the immediate needs71 of the victims of the war.  
In order to continue the analysis, a precise definition of the term reconciliation is 
needed. Transitional justice scholars have defined reconciliation as both a process and a 
result.72 For instance, John Paul Lederach emphasises that reconciliation is a ‘process of 
change and redefinition of relationships.’73 For some other scholars, reconciliation is a 
process that is focused on the end-state of reconciling the divided communities.74  
In terms of the process, reconciliation can be classified as ‘thin reconciliation’ 
(functional) or ‘thick reconciliation’ (regenerative).75 Thin reconciliation takes place to 
achieve ‘simple coexistence.’76 Under thin reconciliation, there will be no violence between 
 
69 Kate Cronin-Furman, Sri Lanka’s surprise political transition, (12th January 2015) The Washington Post 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/01/11/sri-lankas-surprise-political-
transition/?utm_term=.39b0846deb36>. 
70 Zimbabwe Human rights NGO Forum v Communication No. 245/2002, Decision, 15 May 2006, African 
Human Rights Law Report, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights [AHCPR], 78, 200. 
71 For the purpose of this thesis, immediate needs are referred to the human needs that are required at the 
immediate aftermath of a war. This includes access to food, shelter and proper infrastructure like access to 
sanitary needs. Chapter 5 of this thesis analyses this claim further. 
72 David Bloomfield, ‘On Good Terms: Clarifying Reconciliation’ (Berghof Report No. 14, October 2006, 
Berghoff Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management) 6. 
73 John Paul Lederach, ‘Civil Society and Reconciliation’ in Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing 
International Conflict (Washington DC, USIP) 847. 
74 Lara Waldorf above n 62, 117.  
75 Paul Seils, ‘The Place of Reconciliation in Transitional Justice – Conceptions and misconceptions’ (2017) 
International Center for Transitional Justice Briefing paper 1. 
76 Elin Skaar, ‘Reconciliation in a Transitional Justice Perspective’, (2013) 1 (1), Transitional Justice Review 4, 65. 
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the parties.77 Parties to the conflict put down their weapons and obey the existing law that 
upholds peace and democracy.78 However, in this type of a situation people do not trust 
each other.79 This is at the very initial stage of reconciliation since it primarily focuses on 
ending the violent incidents.  
Thick reconciliation, on the other hand, is complex and involves improving respect 
for the dignity of all persons, reversing structural causes for discrimination and reducing 
marginalisation.80 This type of reconciliation attempts to heal the damaged relationships in 
the individual level. Due to its nature, thick reconciliation is also known as regenerative 
reconciliation. Rather than focusing on the violent incidents, thick reconciliation focuses on 
the root causes for the conflict.81 As stated above, violent conflict in Sri Lanka has ended. 
However, Tamils and Sinhalese live with fear and lack of trust because the root causes of the 
conflict have not been addressed. Thus, for the purpose of this research, thick reconciliation 
over thin reconciliation is preferred.  
The large scholarship on transitional justice82 demonstrates that several means have 
been utilised to achieve its aims. The classical transitional justice mechanism includes at 
least six means: criminal prosecutions, truth commissions, reparations programs, gender 
justice, security system reforms and memorialization efforts.83 Amongst these mechanisms, 
the UNHCR resolution on Sri Lanka required the implementation of a truth commission and 
a hybrid court. Hence, the third chapter to this thesis will make a comprehensive analysis of 
these two mechanisms.  
Considering these factors, for the purpose of this research, reconciliation is defined 
as, a process which is used to heal the damaged relationships caused by massive human 
rights violations.84 The term reconciliation can be used in different contexts. Reconciliation 
 
77 Ibid. 
78 David Crooker “Reckoning with Past Wrongs: A Normative Framework” in Dilemmas of Reconciliation: Cases 
and Concepts, eds. Catol A.L Prager and Trudy Govier (Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 2003) 
54. 
79 Lara Waldorf, above n 62. 
80 Paul Seils, Above n 75, 1. 
81 Ibid. 
82 See for example, Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice, (Oxford University Press, 1st edition, 2004); Susanne 
Buckleyistel et al, Transitional Justice Theories, (Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 1st edition, 2014); Colleen 
Murphy, The Conceptual Foundations of Transitional Justice, (Cambridge University Press, 1st edition 2017). 
83 Lara Waldorf, ‘Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of Rwanda’ International Centre for Transitional 
Justice, (New York, June 2009). 
84 Ibid. 
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originally derived from the Latin term reconciliare, which means ‘make friendly again.’85 
Christianity uses this term to define the damaged relationships between the God and 
people.86 The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission equated the term 
reconciliation with forgiveness.87 These definitions are relevant to a post-conflict 
reconciliation setting. Put simply, war damages relationships between the parties to the 
conflict. In the aftermath of the conflict, it is essential to repair the relationships between 
these parties. Instead of God and people relationship, post-conflict reconciliation focuses on 
healing the damaged relationship between parties to the conflict. 
Now this chapter turns to examine the conceptual framework utilized in the forthcoming 
chapters of this thesis.  
 
1.4 Conceptual framework 
The second chapter of this thesis will demonstrate that the existing mechanisms for 
transitional justice, and reconciliation in particular, have serious shortcomings.88 For this 
reason, reconciliation should be viewed from a different perspective. This thesis takes the 
Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) as an alternative approach to 
examine the problem of reconciliation in Third World states. TWAIL was initiated by Third 
World academics for the purpose of introducing a more just international legal system 
against the existing international law.89 TWAIL requires a reconsideration of classical 
international law from the grassroots perspective of Third World people. Until now, TWAIL 
has not been utilised as a framework for analysis of post-conflict reconciliation. Accordingly, 
this thesis takes a novel step in using TWAIL as an approach to post-conflict reconciliation in 
Sri Lanka. This thesis demonstrates that from a TWAIL perspective, the central obstacle to 
reconciliation in a Third World country is the increased structural violence that resulted 
from the period of conflict.  
 
85 R R. K. Barnhart, The Barnhart Dictionary of Etymology (1988), article “reconciliare.”  
86 The Bible, 2. Cor. 5:19.  
87 Brandon Hamber and Hugo van der Merwe, “What Is This Thing Called Reconciliation?” (paper presented at 
the Goedgedacht Forum Cape Town, 1998). <http://www.wits.ac.za/csvr/articles/artrcb&h.htm>. 
88 Chapter 2 page 18 of this thesis. 
89 Makau Mutua and Antonie Anghie, 'What is TWAIL' (2000) 94 American Society of International Law; 
Cambdridge University Press 31. 
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Structural violence is violence which exists within the institutional or social structure 
in a given society. 90 In simple terms, there are several factors that cause structural violence 
to specific groups or individuals in a given society. For instance, a government policy can 
provide unreasonable benefits, or privileges to one ethnic group whilst providing 
disadvantages to another ethnic group. This creates conditions in which the unprivileged 
group has antipathy towards the privileged group. This thesis advances the idea that 
increased structural violence caused by the increased socio-political problems created by 
the civil war is the central obstacle to reconciliation. The second chapter to this thesis 
makes a comprehensive analysis of this claim. 
To address this problem of increased structural violence, the thesis suggests the use 
of the capabilities approach (see chapter 2).91 The capabilities approach identifies that all 
people must have the freedom to achieve wellbeing and this freedom should be based on 
the capabilities of the people. This approach is based on two main factors: functioning of 
the individuals (what individuals value doing or value being) and the freedom (the 
opportunity to accomplish what individuals’ value) they have, to pursue the functioning.92 
This thesis argues that applying the capabilities approach is an effective way to mitigate 
increased structural violence and allow reconciliation. 
The capabilities approach is a social justice (wellbeing) theory.93 Hence, the solution 
suggested by this approach also focuses on advancing the social justice and wellbeing of 
individuals.94 From a capabilities approach, this thesis suggests two main elements to 
pursue the reconciliation mechanism: (a) a strong power sharing mechanism to increase the 
political participation of the minority groups, and (b) economic reconstruction to ensure 
minority inclusion in the economic process. This thesis argues that these elements are 
required to achieve a restorative form of transitional justice. In chapter 3, the thesis 
 
90 Johan Galtung, ‘Violence, Peace and Peace Research’ (1969) 6 (3), Journal of Peace Research 167. 
91 See, Amartya Sen, Commodities and Capabilities, (Oxford University Press, 1st edition, 1985). Amartya Sen, 
‘Development as Capability Expansion’ (1989) 19, Journal of Development Planning 41-58; Amartya Sen, 
‘Capabilities, Lists and Public Reason: Continuing the Conversation’ (2004) 10 (3) Feminist Economics; Martha 
Nussbaum, ‘Nature, Functioning and Capability: Aristotle on Political Distribution’ (1988) Oxford Studies in 
Ancient Philosophy; Martha Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach 
(Cambridge University Press 1st edition. 2000). 
92 Sabina Alkire, ‘The Capability Approach and Human Development’ (Presentation, Oxford Poverty and Human 
Development Initiative. <http://www.ophi.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/IDB-What-is-the-Capability-
Approach.pdf>. 
93 Amartya Sen, above n, 91. 
94 Ibid. 
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demonstrates that the classical mechanisms for reconciliation including truth commissions 
and hybrid courts tends not to help in this mission in achieving restorative form of 
transitional justice.  
Chapter 4 examines the first (proposed) element for reconciliation, a power sharing 
mechanism. This chapter introduces the elements for a successful power sharing 
mechanism and identifies the existing conditions for power sharing in Sri Lanka. It then 
examines the weaknesses of the Sri Lankan power sharing mechanism and proposes three 
recommendations to address these weaknesses: (a) election of a Governor from each 
Provincial Council; (b) implementation of national government consultative committees and 
(c) implementation of a permanent minority seat in the government. 
Chapter 5 examines the economic elements of an effective reconciliation mechanism. 
The chapter starts with an analysis of the economic conditions in Sri Lanka and identifies the 
economic inequality in post conflict Sri Lanka. Then this chapter examines the reasons for 
the economic inequality and identifies lack of capabilities of the war victims and lack of 
credit facilities as a restriction. The fifth chapter then introduces three recommendations to 
address these problems.  
 
1.5 Methodology 
To examine the above research objectives this thesis critically investigates and 
analyses the existing sources of international law that analyse the concept of reconciliation. 
For instance, it examines the guidance notes of the United Nations Secretary General on 
transitional justice, and relevant UN resolutions, mandates and materials that establish the 
existing norms of international law towards reconciliation. Secondly, relevant literature 
belonging to reconciliation, TWAIL and the capabilities approach is examined. TWAIL is used 
to examine an alternative mechanism to supplement the existing approach. TWAIL  
attempts to avoid the First World and Third World political leaders’ perspective by inviting 
to examine issues from a people’s perspective. This research uses this perspective as an 
analytical theme.  The capabilities approach is used to introduce the elements that should 
be implemented to address the central problem introduced in this thesis.  
This thesis relies on primary sources such as statutes, treaties and guidance notes of 
the United Nations Secretary General. The thesis also places a substantial weight on (a) 
scholarly work on TWAIL and the capabilities approach and (b) literature and reports on Sri 
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Lanka’s ongoing political and economic situation. There were some difficulties in accessing 
documents because the Sri Lankan government restricts access to information. 
Furthermore, given that TWAIL and the capabilities approach are relatively new subjects, 
there is less scholarly work available on these topics.  
 
1.6 Contribution of this study 
By using the above methodology, this thesis makes two main contributions. First it 
makes a contribution to the discipline of TWAIL. TWAIL is an emerging concept within public 
international law. It is still at a developmental stage and had been subject to criticism by 
academics of classical international law; and commendation by radical thinking Third World 
academics in international law.95 The Third World has seen this approach as addressing the 
needs of the Third World population.96 Given that Sri Lanka is a Third World state, this 
research is central to the needs of the Third World. Hence it attempts to analyse 
reconciliation from a Third World perspective and makes some contribution to the TWAIL 
scholarship. 
Secondly, this thesis aims to make a contribution to the Sri Lankan reconciliation 
mechanism. Sri Lanka currently faces the need of establishing a reconciliation mechanism. 
The proposed reconciliation mechanisms are not capable of fully reconciling the divided 
parties as evident from the ranging acts of violence. Hence a successful reconciliation 
mechanism is required to supplement the existing approaches. The structure that is 
proposed by the United Nations had been subjected to criticism by the local population. It 
had also been rejected by several parties of the government. This research aims to 
contribute to the Sri Lankan reconciliation process by proposing a reconciliation mechanism 
that would supplement the existing mechanisms by addressing the existing socio-cultural 
framework in Sri Lanka. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 Currently Sri Lanka experiences serious ethnic conflict due to the lack of a successful 
reconciliation mechanism. There is also a danger of the recurrence of a civil war in the 
 
95 Makau Mutua and Antonie Anghie, above n 89, 31.  
96 Ibid. 
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foreseeable future. The international community has suggested several mechanisms to 
support reconciliation in Sri Lanka. These ‘classical’ mechanisms require the implementation 
a criminal tribunal and a truth commission. Previous criminal tribunals and truth 
commissions established in relation to conflicts in other parts of the world have proven to 
be of limited success in reconciling divided ethnic groups. Hence, these mechanisms are 
important but not sufficient and should be supported by an alternative mechanism. The 
following chapters will examine an alternative mechanism to support these classical 
mechanisms in its mission of reconciling the divided ethnic groups in Sri Lanka.  
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Chapter 2 – Reconciliation: A new conceptual framework 
Introduction 
This thesis aims to lay the basis for introduction of a successful reconciliation 
mechanism for Sri Lanka. To this end, this chapter will identify the key preconditions for a 
successful reconciliation mechanism in a Third World country. For this purpose, the chapter 
is organized in three sections. The first section demonstrates the need to support the 
existing international law for reconciliation through an additional mechanism. It then 
introduces the TWAIL approach as an appropriate substitute to the existing international 
law framework for reconciliation.  
The second section examines the reconciliation problem from a TWAIL perspective. 
From a TWAIL perspective, structural inequality leading to increased structural violence is a 
significant obstacle for a successful reconciliation mechanism in a post-conflict Third World 
country. It shows that structural violence emerges mainly due to the existing social and 
institutional structures in a given post-conflict society and causes unequal life chances 
triggering social division. As a result, one group in the society has antipathy against the 
other group(s), making it more challenging to address reconciliation.  
The third section introduces a framework to address the increased structural 
violence and demonstrates that the initial requirement is to address the basic human needs 
of the victims. The capabilities approach suggests two main ways to address the basic 
human needs. This includes: political participation and economic development of the 
victims. In addition to this, an added requirement is suggested to achieve reconciliation 
within a reasonable timeframe.   
This chapter concludes by demonstrating that implementation of these elements (in 
addition to the establishment of a criminal tribunal and other classical ways of 
reconciliation) can help reconciling the divided communities in a Third World post-conflict 
society.  
*** 
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Section I – An alternative approach to international law  
2.1 (a) Why an alternative approach is required?  
With decolonization, a large number of newly independent states from Asia, Africa 
and Latin America entered into the international system in the 1950s and 1960s.97 Upon 
their independence, these states experienced economic difficulties and struggled to recover 
from colonialism. For instance, World Bank reports (2013) indicate that the poverty rate in 
Sub-Saharan Africa is at 41.0%, South Asia at 15.1% whilst Europe and Central Asia remains 
at 2.2%.98 Both Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia were subjected to colonialism. This 
demonstrates that states which were under colonialism suffer from extreme poverty. Also, 
amongst the 23 countries with the lowest GDP, 19 states were under the colonial rule for a 
prolonged period.99 In addition to these economic difficulties, the newly independent states 
experience some other problems that were caused during colonialism. For instance, in 
Africa the colonial masters divided territories by using unnatural borders which ignored 
local ethnic structure.100 This resulted in ethnic and religious conflicts. Conflicts between (a) 
Maasai ethnic group in Kenya and Tanzania and (b) Hausa ethnic group in Nigeria and Niger 
are examples.101 These records demonstrate that after independence, the colonized states 
encountered a series of problems. 
To date, most of these problems have not been resolved. For this reason, even after 
their independence, the newly independent states seek economic and political assistance 
from their colonial masters. For instance, Indonesia’s economy is heavily dependent on 
bilateral loans.102 The top six countries that offer loans to Indonesia are the First World 
states including Japan, Germany, the United States, Austria, France and the Netherlands.103 
This means that Indonesia (in this case and Third World states in general) has an increased 
dependency on First World states. Bhupinder Chimni, a leading Professor of Law in the 
 
97 Office of the Historian, Decolonisation of Asia and Africa, 1945-1960 (01st April 2017) Office of the Historian 
<https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/asia-and-africa>. 
98 Tariq Khokhar, How does extreme poverty vary by region? (17th October 2016) The World Bank, 
<https://blogs.worldbank.org/opendata/chart-how-does-extreme-poverty-vary-region>. 
99 Graziella Bertocchi and Fabio Canova, ‘Did Colonization Matter for Growth: Empirical Exploration into the 
Historical Causes of Africa’s Underdevelopment?’ (Draft, CPR London and CEPR Italy, December 1996). 
100 Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou, ‘The Long-run Effects of the Scramble for Africa’ (Working 
Paper No. 17620, National Bureau of Economic Research, November 2011). 
101 Ibid. 
102 National NGO Forum on Indonesian Development, ‘Profiles of Indonesia’s Foreign Debts’ (Working Paper, 
International NGO Forum on Indonesian Development, August 2007) 4. 
103 Ibid. 
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TWAIL movement, defines this dependence as a ‘relocation of sovereign economic 
power.’104 For Chimni, the Third World states who are dependent on their First World 
counterparts have to limit their independent development.  
As a result of this increased dependency, the Third World states are suppressed by 
the First World states. The approval of loans by the First World countries to the Third World 
countries are dependent on the willingness of the Third World states to pursue their 
agenda. For instance, Sri Lanka lost the European Union Generalized Scheme of Preferences 
(GSP) Plus in 2009 for the reason of not addressing the human rights related issues raised by 
the European Union.105 However, in 2015, the European Union reinstated the GSP Plus 
concession on condition that the relevant issues will be addressed. For this reason, the 
current international politics pose ‘unprecedented influence in shaping global policies and 
law.’106 
This dependency restricts the participation of Third World states in the international 
system as independent and sovereign states.107 This dependence, suppression and 
limitation is deepened due to the understanding of the Third World that the existing 
international law reflects First World interests.  The Third World claim that in the creation of 
international law, the newly independent states had limited participation.108 For instance, a 
number of international treaties including the Geneva Conventions and Kellog Briand Pact 
were enacted with a minimal Third World participation. One possible justification for the 
minimal participation of Third World states (from the First World countries) is the lack of 
human expertise from the Third World states. Practically, the newly independent states 
have not had proper human resources, since the colonial powers handled administration 
and finance services on behalf of them. For instance, in Nigeria when the colonial leaders 
left, there were only 150 lawyers and 160 doctors of local origin.109 For this reason, Third 
 
104 Bhupinder Chimni, ‘Third World Approaches to International Law: A Manifesto’ (2006) 8 (3), International 
Community Law Review 7; Mohsen Al Attar and Rosalie Miller, ‘Towards an Emancipatory International Law: 
the Bolivarian reconstruction’ (2010) 31 (3), Third World Quarterly. 
105 Xinhuanet, ‘EU Council of Ministers approve GSP plus for Sri Lanka’ (11th May 2017) 
<http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-05/11/c_136275125.htm>. 
106 Bhupinder Chimni, Above n 101.  
107 Frederick Snyder and Surakiart Sathirathai, Third World Attitudes toward International Law, (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 1st edition, 1987) 3; Bhupinder Chimni, ‘Prolegomena to a Class Approach to International 
Law’ (2010) 21 (1) The European Journal of International Law.  
108 Ibid. 
109 Hussein Beihami and Fahram Meifa, ‘The Effects of Decolonization in Africa’ (2014) 34-39 World Scientific 
News, 35. 
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World people have not had the opportunity to participate in international law. As a result, 
the initial international law has a minimal Third World viewpoint. 
The problems experienced by the Third World and the First World are different.110 
Hence, the international law with only a First World perspective does not equally answer 
the problems of the Third World and the First World. For instance, from climate problems to 
socio-cultural problems and from economic problems to political problems, the First World 
and the Third World differs. The South experiences a large number of ethnic and social 
problems. Comparatively, the West encounters a large number of political problems rather 
than ethnic and social problems.  
Not only the problems but also the approach taken by the two groups to solve these 
problems differs. For instance, instead of accepting a judicial mechanism that is 
international in nature, Third World people tend to accept a non-judicial domestic 
mechanism.111 The Gacaca court in Rwanda is a good example. In 2001, the Gacaca court 
was implemented in Rwanda to respond to the Rwandan genocide. This is a system of 
governance that implemented as per the law enforcement procedures followed in the 
Rwandan traditional cultural law rules.112 The trusted citizens at the communal level, for 
instance the reputed elderly people, were the law enforcement officers and judges in this 
system.  This system has been more widely accepted in the Rwandan communities than 
international courts. The reason for this acceptance is the familiarity and trust these 
individuals have towards these institutions.113 
Also, the Third World and the First World differently respond to the notion of law. 
For most of the Third World communities, law is a “body of ethical and political 
principles.”114 However the First World identifies the law as a “logical system of rules to be 
 
110 See, Maurice Flory, ‘Adapting International Law to the Development of the Third World’ (1982) 26 (1), 
Journal of African Law 12; Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner, The Limits of International Law (American 
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1st edition, 2005).  
111 Ibrahim Shihata, ‘The Attitude of New States Toward the International Court of Justice’ (1965) 19(2), 
International Organization; RP Anand, ‘Role of the New Asian-African Countries in the Present International 
Legal Order’ (1962) 56(2), The American Journal of International Law. 
112 The United Nations, The Justice and Reconciliation Process in Rwanda: Background Note (March 2014), The 
United Nations 
<http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/pdf/Backgrounder%20Justice%202014.pdf>.  
113 Ibid. 
114 Quincy Wright, ‘The Influence of the New Nations of Asia and Africa upon International Law’, (1958) Foreign 
Affairs Reports 38. 
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applied for the solution of disputes and the conduct of relations.”115 As a result, the 
response of the Third World and the First World to international law also differs. For 
instance, Rwandan people positively respond to the Gacaca court system. As described 
above, this system allows the respected adults in the community to hear the grievances of 
the people and provide solutions accordingly. In that sense, this system is not a judiciary 
itself, but a more culturally personable approach to address grievances.  
Given the circumstances, it is clear that there is a need for an alternative approach 
to include the Third World interests in the existing international law. 
 
2.1 (b) TWAIL – an appropriate alternative 
In response to the above concerns, a separate movement was established, which 
came to be known as Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL). The intention 
of this movement was to pursue the interests of the Third World people.116 The inner 
ideology of TWAIL differs from one TWAILer to another and they do not share similar 
interests on political, economic and social problems faced by the Third World people.117 
However, it is their common understanding that existing international law is oppressive and 
unjust.118 Thus, TWAIL commonly responds to ‘illegitimate, predatory, oppressive and unjust 
regime of international law.’119 Hence, the common quest of TWAIL is to pluralize existing 
international law to include the interests of the Third World people.120 In this mission, 
TWAIL does not reject classical international law. Rather, it attempts to reform the existing 
international law to include the interests of the Third World people. 
To achieve this aim, TWAIL identifies the problems faced by the Third World people 
and provide solutions in a manner that would match with the Third World conditions. 
Accordingly, the solutions suggested by TWAIL intends to empower the Third World people. 
Firstly, TWAIL recognices multiple identities and heterogeneity,121 and that can provide 
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solutions to some of the Third World problems in a national and an international context.122 
In an international context, heterogeneity claims the inclusion of Third World perspective in 
the international law. In a national context, heterogeneity claims that different ethnicities 
must be recognized. This directly addresses the problem of non-recognition of Tamils in Sri 
Lanka by Sinhalese. Thus, TWAIL whilst fighting for equal standing in the international order, 
claims equal standing in a national context. 
Secondly, whilst opposing the autocratic and unjust First World policies, TWAIL also 
opposes the tyranny and autocratic policies of Third World leaders.123 Instead, TWAIL 
prefers solutions that are accepted by the Third World people. Accordingly, TWAIL takes a 
people-centric approach towards most of the problems experienced by the Third World 
people.124 For this reason, TWAIL does not oppose the existing international law as a whole 
but proposes a more flexible approach that could make adequate solutions to most of the 
problems of the Third World people. As discussed elsewhere in this thesis, from a people’s 
perspective, structural inequality is a significant problem for reconciliation. TWAIL provides 
significant attention to this structural inequality. For instance, the organizing characteristic 
of TWAIL is twofold: (a) to deconstruct structural inequality and (b) provide an alternative 
legal edifice for international governance.125 In that sense, the theoretical notion of TWAIL 
leads to address the structural inequality that has been systematized into the very structure 
of a given society. Hence TWAIL should be identified as a people-centric approach that 
adjusts the existing conditions in international law as required for their needs.  
Amongst the problems that TWAIL discussed so far, problems related to self-
determination, non-intervention, foreign direct investment, special and differential 
treatment in international trade and law of the sea are in the forefront.126 Given the 
increased number of conflicts that emerged in the Third World over the last few decades, 
post-conflict reconciliation has been a major problem for the Third World people. Despite 
the fact that TWAIL intends to provide solutions to the problems faced by the Third World 
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people, to date TWAIL scholars have not examined post-conflict reconciliation to identify 
adequate solutions. As a result, problems related to post-conflict reconciliation mechanisms 
were largely left unanswered. This makes the existing international legal framework the 
only source of application for reconciliation. There are (at least) three main reasons to 
propose a reconciliation mechanism that is within the TWAIL approach. 
First, most of the reconciliation mechanisms within the exiting international legal 
framework have failed, mainly because these mechanisms disregard the Third World 
perspectives. Mechanisms in Rwanda, former Yugoslavia and Cambodia are examples of 
this. It appears that these mechanisms should tailor to the Third World needs. TWAIL 
approach also has a similar perspective; whilst not rejecting the claims made in the classical 
international law, TWAIL argues that the classical international law should be changed to 
provide more effective solutions to the problems of Third World people. Chapter 3 makes a 
comprehensive analysis on the lack of success of truth commissions and hybrid courts.  
Second, the mechanisms established for reconciliation under the existing legal 
framework limitedly reflect the needs of the people. An alternative mechanism is needed to 
reflect the actual needs of the people. The application of the classical international law for 
reconciliation has involved a number of elements. Most of these elements are detailed in 
the Guidance Note of the Secretary General.127 This Guidance Note states that in the 
implementation of a transitional justice mechanism, the UN instruments should be taken 
into consideration.128 Even though the second principle of the guidance note requires the 
responsible officers to take account of the unique political context of the particular country, 
the commentary to this element provides that measures should be “framed first of all in the 
context of international legal obligations.”129 The international legal obligations to 
transitional justice are found in various treaties130 (hard law)131 and several UN 
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documents132 (soft law).133 These principles also require the international community to 
have specific focus on the transitional justice process. In practice when the international 
community works closely with the transitional justice process, domestic factors will be 
disregarded. This has been the case in most of the transitional justice mechanisms, including 
Cambodia, Rwanda and former Yugoslavia. Solutions provided in Cambodia has not 
examined the domestic factors and Rwandan people never felt the consequence of the 
mechanism given the distance of the mechanism, not only physically but also from the 
hearts of the people.  
Third, the existing mechanism on reconciliation does not give attention to the most 
substantial issue of increased structural violence. As a result, existing mechanisms left 
addressing a substantial restriction to reconciliation. Through a practical lens, at the end of 
the conflict, victims of the conflict encounter socio-cultural, economic, political and 
emotional challenges. The classical transitional justice framework attempted to answer the 
emotional challenges by way of a criminal tribunal or a truth-seeking mechanism. However, 
the political, economic and social problems have not been properly addressed by these 
mechanisms. As a result, it is challenging for these mechanisms to reconcile the divided 
communities.  
TWAIL scholars including Bhupinder Chimni, Anthony Anghie, Sujith Xavior, and 
James Gathii argue that mainstream international law does not sufficiently address the 
problems of third world people.134 In order to address these problems, TWAIL proposes a 
different approach to change the content of international law in order to provide solutions 
to the problems of the third world people. Mainstream international lawyers argue that 
 
131 Hard laws refer to the binding legal instruments which gives binding responsibilities to a state. I corrected 
this in an earlier version. Please refer back to my suggestion. You should also provide a source of the 
definition. 
132 Updated Principles to Combat Impunity and UN Secretary General’s report on the Rule of Law and justice in 
Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies. This is not a complete citation. Are you referring to two documents? Then 
you need two complete references with pinpoints – where can the reader find these documents and the part 
of those texts on which you rely? 
133 Soft laws refer to the quasi-legal instruments that has no binding effect or has a very little binding force. 
Where did you get this definition from? Plus grammatically incorrect. Please correct and provide source of 
definition. 
134 Bhupinder Chimni, above n 109, 26; Mohsen Al Attar and Rosalie Miller, ‘Towards an Emancipatory 
International Law: the Bolivarian reconstruction’ (2010) 31 (3), Third World Quarterly 209, 211, Makau Mutua 
and Antonie Anghie, above n 89, 31, John D Haskell, ‘TRAIL-ing TWAIL: Arguments and Blind Spots in 
Third World Approaches to International Law’ (2014) 27 (2) Canadian Journal of Law & 383, 383, James Thuo 
Gathii, ‘Rejoinder: Twailing International Law’ (1999) 98, Michigan Law Review 2071; Andrew Sunter, ‘TWAIL 
as Naturalized Epistemological Inquiry’ (2007) 20 (2) Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 202. 
 25 
TWAIL does not have an external ground on which to challenge the hegemony of 
international law.135 In other words, these scholars argue that TWAIL is not an alternative to 
mainstream international law. 136 Rather, TWAIL consists of the same principles used in 
mainstream international law.137  
In responding to this claim, TWAIL scholars argue that TWAIL consist of mainstream 
international law however when applying these principles, TWAIL takes a flexible approach 
with the aim of answering third world problems.138 Clarifying this position further, TWAIL 
scholars explain that the third world leaders are unwilling to follow mainstream 
international law.139 For instance, when the Sri Lankan civil war came to an end in 2009, 
President Rajapakse showed his unwillingness to follow international principles on war 
crimes claiming that these principles would not support the Sri Lankan case.140 Third world 
leaders’ unwillingness to comply with international law leads third world people to believe 
that the existing international law oppresses them.141  
However, TWAIL scholars take a different approach to suggest solutions for third 
world countries. For instance, the revised Anglo-Iraq Treaty of 1948, which followed 
mainstream international law, created a semi-colonial mandate system in Iraq.142 There 
were several protests and requests to change the content of the treaty by Iraqis. These local 
reflections were not considered when drafting the treaty. TWAIL scholars like Ali Hammoudi 
recently analysed the treaty and proposed an alternative mechanism to the semi-colonial 
mandate system. 143 Hammoudi argues that a TWAIL perspective at the time could have 
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produced an effective alternative to the mandate system.144 This argument and his 
alternative proposals are based on the interests of the local people.145  
The starting point of TWAIL analysis is to examine the needs of third world people 
and then propose solutions. Therefore, it is clear that TWAIL provides an alternative 
perspective to existing international law. 146 In this context, this thesis proposes that the 
existing classical international mechanisms for reconciliation should be supplemented by an 
approach to that provides solutions to the problems of the third world people. This chapter 
now turns to examine structural violence and its relationship to reconciliation. Then it 
analyses how TWAIL offers a solution to this problem of structural violence. 
 
Section II - Central focus of the new approach 
2.2 Structural Violence  
Whether violence can include forms other than physical violence is a contentious 
issue. Johan Galtung argued that violence can include both physical violence and non-
physical violence147 and categorized them into three forms: direct violence, cultural violence 
and structural violence.148 Direct violence is the most obvious type of violence in which 
every form of violence from rape, murder, conflict, to even psychological abuse comes 
under. Cultural violence is a form of violence that arises from aspects of culture and social 
life and that causes violence happening in a particular society. The third form is structural 
violence. Galtung defines structural violence as a form of violence that linked to the 
structure of the society and its institutions. Hence, in structural violence, violence is an 
integral part of the very structure of human organisation rather than that of human 
conditions such as rape and murder.149 Galtung argues that structural violence is caused by 
the “avoidable impairment of fundamental human needs”. Paul E Farmer clarifies this by 
 
144 Ibid, 2040.  
145 Ibid, 2041.   
146 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘The Politics of International Law, 20 Years Later’ (2009) 20 (1) European Journal of 
International Law, 7, 9.  
147 Johan Galtung ‘Cultural Violence’ (1990) Journal of Peace Research 27(3), 303; Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom 
Woodhouse and Hugh Miall, Contemporary Conflict Resolution (Polity Press, 2011) 199-202. 
148 Ibid. 
149 Johan Galtung, above n 90, 167.  
 27 
describing structural violence as “social arrangements that put individuals and populations 
in harm’s way.”150  
Through these definitions, it is clear that structural violence arises owing to the 
particular social or institutional structures. Put simply, two main groups exist in a post-
conflict society: victims of the conflict and non-victims of the conflict. This thesis 
acknowledges that according to the level of victimization these groups can be categorized 
further. For instance, some groups can be victimized by the civil war by disruption of human 
resources, whilst some other groups may only be affected by lose of infrastructure facilities.  
Wars tend to cause structural inequality between the victims and non-victims of the 
conflict. On the one hand, the direct effect of the war i.e. destruction of the infrastructure, 
livelihood, human capital can cause a substantial economic and political loss to the victims 
of the conflict. Comparatively, non-victims (who are outside the conflict situation) are not 
affected as heavily as the victims.151 Given that the non-victims get more access to 
education and better infrastructure facilities, they are more privileged than the victims. For 
this reason, as a direct result of the civil war there could be an increase in structural 
inequality within the society. 
On the other hand, social conditions that lead to the conflict can further structural 
inequality between the two groups. Put simply, chapter 1 of this thesis identified several 
causes for the emergence of civil war in Sri Lanka.152 Amongst them were the discrimination 
and political exclusion of the Tamils and lack of proper economic facilities. Conflict can 
trigger this process. For instance, currently Sri Lanka faces high levels of discrimination 
against the Tamils. It has risen to the level that certain Sinhalese Buddhist groups remove 
the green and orange stripes in the Sri Lankan flag which demonstrates the inclusion of 
Tamils and Muslims in the Sri Lankan society. Also, as chapter 1 demonstrated, a number of 
violent incidents against the Tamils were emerged in contemporary Sri Lankan society. Thus, 
it is clear that the existing social and institutional structure causes structural inequality 
within a post-conflict society.  
Unlike direct violence, the cause of structural violence are the policies, rules or 
norms that are institutionalized in a particular social structure. In a post-conflict situation, 
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the governing structure continues to be affected by the policies or norms prevailing during 
the conflictual situation. This is triggered by the social settings of the war. Here, the notion 
of thick reconciliation interlinks with structural violence. As explained elsewhere in this 
thesis,153 thick reconciliation requires the reversal of the structural causes for discrimination 
and marginalization.154 Structural violence, which is a result of the increased inequality 
between two (or more) groups, emerges as a result of the policies or norms in a particular 
society. For this reason, in order to address thick reconciliation, structural violence should 
be mitigated.  
Policies of a government or the social norms caused by a civil war can provide undue 
advantage to one ethnic group and disadvantage to another ethnic group. Violence can 
occur due to this unequal treatment. Take a simple example, in 1956 the Sri Lankan 
government brought an Act to make Sinhalese language the official language in Sri Lanka.155 
The Tamils considered having similar recognition to their language as a basic need, which 
was ignored for years.156 As a result, the government work was done only in Sinhalese 
language, including in Tamil dominated areas. For this reason, Tamils who had less 
competency in Sinhalese language experienced severe conditions. Given that the 
government documents (applications, forms etc.) were only in Sinhalese language; the 
judiciary heard cases in Sinhalese language and interviews for government jobs were 
conducted in Sinhalese language. Tamils were deprived of government welfare and 
privileges. As chapter 1 explained, this Act is one of the main reasons for the emergence of 
discrimination and marginalization of the Tamil minorities which ultimately resulted in 
direct violence between the Sinhalese and the Tamils.157  
Take another example. In Rwanda, after the genocide the racial identities for Hutus 
and Tutsis existed for a prolonged period. Racial inequality is one major form of structural 
violence.158 Hence, in the process of addressing structural violence in a post-conflict society, 
racial inequality would be a central problem. The severity of racial inequality often gives rise 
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to poverty and other forms of structural violence.159 This has been the case in most post-
conflict societies. When racial inequality is tied to poverty, this affects the institutionalized 
social structure of that society. This can restrict the fundamental needs of an individual or a 
group of individuals being met. 
Due to structural violence, the group who undergoes suffering generates a strong 
form of antipathy against the privileged. In that sense, this research identifies three main 
requirements for structural violence: (a) policies, norms or rules within a particular society; 
(b) structural inequality that privileges one group to the detriment of another group; (c) 
antipathy that the unprivileged group have towards the privileged.160  
In terms of a post-conflict situation, increased structural violence can be a major 
problem in limiting attempts at reconciliation. The existing social and institutional structure 
in a post-conflict society tends to deepen the violence between the parties. For instance, 
post-conflict societies are mainly divided in terms of the racial identity. Also, due to the 
massive destruction caused by war, unequal life chances is a key problem in a post-conflict 
situation.161 For instance, the people who are heavily affected will lose their relatives, 
houses, belongings and even the livelihood.162 However, the people who have not been 
affected may not suffer the same consequences. This causes a structural imbalance in the 
society. Hence, it is highly probable that increased structural violence exists in a post-
conflict society due to the large number of unmet needs of the war victims. 
Thus, in the quest of reconciling the divided parties, it is essential that priority is 
given to address the issue of increased structural violence since that is one central problem 
that requires an immediate solution. Put simply, the direct effect of a violent conflict 
towards the economy of a given society is on economic growth.163 The unsafe business 
environment can destroy the productive forces and can result in the increase of transaction 
costs.164 Violence can also result in destroying the human capital causing more inequality to 
the victims. For this reason, violent conflicts often cause disparities in income level. 
Accordingly, one group, usually the non-victims get some advantages, the other (victims) 
 
159 Ibid.  
160 See the above analysis in chapter 2 of this thesis.  
161 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Rule of Law Tools for Post-Conflict 
States – Truth Commissions, 2006.  
162 Ibid.  
163 Cagatay Bircan, Tilman Bruck and Marc Vothknecht, Violent Conflict and Inequality IZA Discussion Paper No. 
4990The Institute of the Study of Labor (IZA) 6. 
164 Ibid. 
 30 
often are deprived of economic conditions.165 For instance, reports indicate that the poverty 
rate in the Northern Province (where the war took place) is 7.7% whilst the metropolitan 
Western Province remaining at 1.7%.166 Similarly, the unemployment rates in the two areas 
(war affected and non-war affected) are at 2.9% in Colombo and 6.3% in Kilinochchi.167   
 Given that there is no society that has purely eradicated structural violence, the 
reconciling authorities should focus on reducing the level of structural violence in the 
society to avoid the recurrence of a civil war. In the absence of this, reconciliation might not 
reach its full potential since the mechanism does not address a central problem. Also, when 
the structural inequalities coincide with political factors, it will make the situation worse. 
When the reconciliation mechanisms avoid considering increased structural violence 
as a threat and attempt to address other factors such as justice and political reforms, it 
weakens the reconciliation process. Accordingly, it might give rise to another armed conflict. 
For instance, in Sri Lanka, during the first phase of the civil war, adequate measures were 
not taken to mitigate structural violence within the society.168 This resulted in the 
emergence of a more harmful armed conflict within a few years.169 Hence, it is important 
that emphasis is placed on mitigating the increased structural violence as an aim of a 
reconciliation mechanism. 
Transitional justice literature has not given sufficient focus to the problem of 
structural violence. Rather, peace building and trust building were considered to be the 
main aims of reconciliation.170 There are two major reasons for considering minimizing the 
level of structural violence as a major aim of any reconciliation mechanism. First, until the 
structural violence is addressed, it is difficult to reduce the level of inequality in the society. 
For that reason, reaching peace is challenging. Given that peace is important for 
reconciliation, it is essential that the reconciliation mechanism is focused on mitigating 
structural violence. Second, as long as the structural violence and the structural inequality is 
high, there is a threat of reemergence of the conflict. Hence, despite other measures taken 
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for reconciliation, if the core problem, structural violence, is not addressed, there is a threat 
of conflict recurrence. 
With reference to the first count; that mitigating structural violence is important for 
peace; the focus must be on two questions: (a) what is peace in a post-conflict society and 
(b) is it possible that the end of the armed violence results in developing peaceful relations 
between conflicting parties? Galtung defined peace as “the absence of violence.”171 The end 
of armed conflict would necessarily mark the end of casualties and deaths resulting from 
conflict. This does not mean that peace is achieved in the post-conflict society, since the 
parties to the conflict are suspicious of each other and seek vengeance. Hence, it is obvious 
that peace is not achieved in the post-conflict society.  
 
Section III – Addressing structural violence  
The next step is to determine how the aim of mitigating structural violence should 
be best achieved. Given that social inequalities are inherently linked to structural violence, 
there is a need for a model which addresses social inequality in a holistic way. The 
capabilities approach is such a model. The chapter now turns to examine whether the 
capabilities approach can provide criteria for a successful reconciliation process in a post-
conflict society.  
The capabilities approach intends to enhance the wellbeing and the quality of life by 
considering the opportunities of the people, individual abilities, available resources and 
personal values.172 Throughout various studies, this approach had been used to analyse the 
structural inequality in a given society. For instance, Robeyns has used this approach to 
analyse gender inequality173 and Rod Hick has undertaken a poverty analysis174 using the 
capabilities approach.  
The capabilities approach identifies that people must have the freedom to achieve 
wellbeing and this freedom should be based on the capabilities of the people. This approach 
is based on two main factors: functioning of the individuals (what individuals value doing or 
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value being) and the freedom (the opportunity to accomplish what individuals’ value) they 
have, to pursue the functioning.175 The next subsection argues that the increased structural 
violence can be best addressed by using the capabilities approach. There is no previous 
literature that has used the capabilities approach for this purpose. Hence, this research 
takes a novel step in introducing requirements to address structural violence and achieve 
reconciliation by using the capabilities approach. 
2.3. (a) The capabilities approach and reconciliation 
The capabilities approach and structural violence mainly focus on basic human needs 
of the individuals. Hence, the two approaches are interlinked. Put simply, on the one hand, 
the capabilities approach is used for development agendas that focus on basic human 
needs.176 It necessarily combines people’s basic needs based on their functions and assesses 
the social arrangements and the well-being of the individuals based on the 
requirements/concerns of the individuals.177 On the other, increased structural violence 
causes different groups to be treated unequally by the existing institutional structure to 
different groups. In simple terms, the existing institutional structure provides undue 
advantages to one group whilst ignoring the human needs of the other group. Thus, the 
capabilities approach which discusses the means for providing basic human needs can be 
utilised to propose a system that treats different groups equally. Subsequently, structural 
inequality in the society that leads to increased structural violence can be addressed. 
The approaches that have been used to date for reconciliation, such as the truth-
seeking mechanisms and hybrid courts do not consider the inequality in the particular 
society or basic human needs. Rather, these approaches introduce legal processes that 
identify and punish the perpetrators for the crimes they have committed. Identifying or 
punishing the perpetrators alone does not make a change in the structural inequality. 
Chapter 3 deeply examines this notion. In contrast, the capabilities approach considers 
people’s actual freedom to pursue activities and achieve states of life that people deeply 
value. This is something that goes even beyond human development, since human 
development only considers the basic needs that people require rather than the actual 
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freedoms that they value in obtaining these needs. Hence, the capabilities approach widens 
the focus of economic thinking in relation to the preferences of the people and addresses 
the problem of structural inequality in the society. 
The capabilities approach has already been used as a thematic framework in the 
international development agendas that addresses the issue of basic human needs. This 
includes: The Human Development Report (HDR) and Millennium Development Goals. The 
Human Development Report is the annual milestone of the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP). 178 It is grounded on the capabilities approach.179 The Human 
Development Report, assesses the development of states on the basis of a human 
development approach. It necessarily focuses on human needs and aims to bring human 
development to every individual. The capabilities approach had been considered by the 
UNDP as the most effective way to articulate human development.180 Similarly, the 
capabilities approach had been used to measure the United Nations Human Development 
Index in addition to major human rights instruments.181Also human rights and the 
capabilities approach share the common aim of evaluating the freedom and dignity of the 
individual.182 
The capabilities approach has also been used to evaluate the first six goals included 
in the Millennium Development Goals (eradicate extreme poverty, achieve universal 
primary education, promote gender equality and empower women, reduce child mortality, 
improve maternal health, combat diseases).183 These goals are based on the premise of 
human needs and have been universally accepted as important for international 
development. It had also been accepted as being one of the most comprehensive 
frameworks for development agendas. The capabilities approach had been the thematic 
framework which had been used to analyse the Millennium Development Goals.184 The 
acceptance of Millennium Development Goals demonstrates the importance of the 
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capabilities approach which was the thematic framework utilised to assess the goals. This 
evaluation shows how the MDG attempt to address important conditions of human 
development and; the MDGs represents the capabilities approach in particular. The first 
goal of MDG is eradicating extreme poverty and hunger. The objective of this goal is to 
make all affected individuals employed and to halve the proportion who live in hunger. This 
is the basis of equal economic development. Economic development is an important 
condition for human development and also in the quest of developing peaceful relations it is 
important that every party to the conflict is equally privileged from the economic 
development.  
Human development involves both functions of people and the impact of these 
functions to the people. Hence, people are both beneficiaries and participants in human 
development.185 Accordingly, participation in political processes has been a major element 
in the human development approach. This has been accepted both in human development 
and the capabilities approach. Thus, victims’ participation in the domestic political process is 
considered as crucial for reconciliation. Chapter 4 to this thesis makes a comprehensive 
analysis of this claim.  
 
2.3 (b) Political participation of the victims 
For the purposes of developing a successful reconciliation mechanism in a post-
conflict society, it is essential to satisfy the needs of the victims. Victims’ political 
participation ensures that their views are represented in the political system and this 
increases the likelihood that their needs are effectively addressed. Hence, this chapter 
argues that it is a crucial precondition for an effective reconciliation process to increase the 
political participation of the victims.   
In a violent society, citizens’ political participation is at a low level.186 The victims 
who are in the middle of a conflict are not capable of actively participating in the politics. 
Further, violence also impacts in “citizens’ decision to participate politically, their forms of 
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participation, and the logic of their vote choice.”187 Political participation is an important 
element for democracy, rule of law and democratic governance.188 Political participation 
along with freedom are regarded by the 2014 Human Development Report as crucial 
elements for human development.189 The international community demands equal political 
participation to eliminate discrimination and marginalisation. The International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights established Article 25 to ensure political participation of every 
citizen under any form of situation.190 Many other human rights instruments have also 
established political participation as an important requirement for democracy, justice and 
rule of law.191  
Victims’ political participation can avoid the political marginalisation of the victims. 
This is because when victims actively participate in politics, their own views can be 
represented. The political participation can either be direct or indirect. Elections, interest 
groups and political institutions are mechanisms that exist for direct participation while 
participation in social contexts are indirect forms.192 For this reason, every party to the 
conflict, the victims and perpetrators, must have access to political participation, both in 
relation to elections and the control of power.193 As a result, this research recognises 
increased political participation of the victims as a pre-condition for effective reconciliation.  
In the Northern Ugandan reconciliation mechanism, traditional justice194 played a 
major role which recognized local political perception.195 Accordingly, to a certain level, 
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domestic political will was considered within the reconciliation mechanism. This framework 
had a positive impact on the Northern Ugandan post-conflict society.196 By contrast, the 
Rwandan, East Timorese and Bosnian transitional justice mechanisms had not taken 
domestic political will as a major concern. Scholars argue that, in the long term, these 
mechanisms negatively affected the post-conflict societies. These contrasting viewpoints 
and the results of previous reconciliation mechanisms demonstrate that when domestic 
political will of the affected population is respected, it is highly probable that there would 
be a positive impact towards reconciliation. Chapter 4 of this thesis addresses this problem 
and introduces a mechanism to increase the political participation of the victims. 
 
2.3 (c) Equal economic development  
In terms of reconciling the divided communities, economic stability of the victims of 
the conflict is important.  The Capabilities Approach gives prominence to economic 
development of groups to ensure that their needs are met. The previous reconciliation 
mechanisms demonstrate that economic development has a positive impact on the 
victims.197A satisfactory income level of the victims can ensure improved life standards of 
the victims. Given that structural violence is a social condition based in the existing social 
structure and social institutions, the change of victims’ life standards would also change the 
existing social structure. This would ultimately lower the structural violence levels prevalent 
in the society.  
In his speech at the Global Creative Leadership Summit 2009, Dominique Strauss-
Kahn, the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, stated that peace and 
economic stability are intimately entwined.198 He also stated that “economic instability has 
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provoked political upheaval, social unrest and conflict.”199 Whilst peace is a necessary 
precondition for economic growth, economic growth also fosters peace. Hence, to attain 
peace in any society, it is essential that the victims of war benefit from the economic 
growth.  
Further, Paul Collier identifies that economic growth and diversification can reduce 
the risk of conflict.200 For Collier, this lies in the implementation of policies that would 
increase the income of the victims. Accordingly, this would ultimately result in the reduction 
of any threat to peace. Economic development of the victims does not only reduce the 
threat of violence, but also would impact on the development of the cooperation between 
the parties to the conflict.201 
The notion that economic development of the victims is a precondition for 
reconciliation was shown by the reconciliation mechanisms in Bosnia-Herzegovinia and 
Croatia. These mechanisms implemented three categories of economic development 
interventions throughout the post-conflict societies: (a) establishing microenterprises and 
small businesses; (b) creating economic organizations and (c) rehabilitating the devastated 
physical infrastructure.202 These efforts resulted in a definite improvement in peaceful 
relations between the parties. Especially, the reconciliation mechanism implemented 
processes to include both parties in the economic process making them interdependent.  
For instance, in Gornji Vakuff-Uskoplje, a large war affected city in central Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, with the support of international organizations a small business was 
established by two women to produce and export knitted garments to Scandinavian 
countries. The business was run by Muslims and Croats who had been the conflictual 
parties. The economic development which increased their living standards developed 
peaceful relations between the parties.203 Since the business was interdependent, any 
conflict between them would have negatively impacted on the business which would 
directly impact on their livelihood. Thus, the economic development has involved peaceful 
relations which are essential to address structural violence within the society. 
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A similar pattern was seen in the Travnik business center in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
where a farm was developed. Serbs, Croats and Muslims, who were the conflictual parties, 
were the parties to the business. This business was mainly aimed at building peaceful 
relations through economic development and interdependence, similar to the knit garment 
industry in Gorni Vakuff-Eskoplje. Here, the group included to several ethnicities involved in 
the poultry industry. While one ethnic group produced chicken, the other groups produced 
eggs and egg cartons. Since the development of the business was based on the business 
relations of the groups, it was important for them to maintain friendly relations. 
Subsequently, the economic development, or the intention to develop their economic 
standards, resulted in maintaining peaceful relations and addressing structural violence.204  
Thus, economic development of the victims and peace between the conflictual 
parties are intertwined. It is hence proposed that economic development of the victims is a 
necessary precondition to mitigate structural violence prevalent in a post-conflict society. 
The chapter five of this thesis analyses how the economic development initiative in Sri 
Lanka should be undertaken.  
 
2.3 (c) Timeliness in achieving reconciliation  
Having met these preconditions is not sufficient for a successful reconciliation 
mechanism. Most of the reconciliation mechanisms, including the Rwandan mechanism, is 
not entirely positive since it has taken an extensive period for its operation. Hence, these 
preconditions must be met within a reasonable time frame. Accordingly, apart from the two 
preconditions introduced within the capabilities approach, timeliness of the reconciliation 
mechanism is proposed as a third element to achieve reconciliation.  
 Reconciliation mechanisms in the past prove that if the mechanism takes a long 
period to operate, the intended impact of the mechanism rarely satisfies the victims. The 
reconciliation mechanism of Rwanda commenced in 1995 and operated until 2014 to 
deliver its last judgment.205 The two decades of its operation had little impact on the 
Rwandan community. Indeed, scholars argue that the negative impact of the mechanism 
was higher than its positive impact. In the protracted process of 20 years, the victims of war 
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can face many other problems, whilst in some cases, victims will be dead at the time of the 
operation of the mechanism. Also, in certain cases perpetrators ended up in power over the 
time. This was the case in both Rwanda and Cambodia. When the perpetrators become part 
of the government, it is most unlikely that they would hold a trial against themselves. Even 
if a mechanism had been established, victims cannot expect an impartial trial. Thus, the 
reconciliation mechanism must reach its end aim within the shortest possible time period.   
The Cambodian reconciliation mechanism proves that when the reconciliation 
mechanism takes long to operate, it will have negative effects. The Cambodian mechanism 
addressed the violence that emerged three decades ago. Three decades can affect the 
parties to the conflict in a negative manner. In some occasions, parties might have 
disregarded the violent events and might have forgotten them over the time. Also, the 
Cambodian trial showed that a considerable number of Khmer Rouge who are directly 
affected, and who have directly involved are dead at the time of the operation of the 
mechanism.206 Thus, it had experienced negative effects simply because the mechanism was 
commenced after a considerable time.  
Parinaz Kermani in her writings emphasizes the importance of the reconciliation 
mechanism to operate within a reasonable time period. She states that; “the more time 
passes, the less likely it is that justice will be done.”207 This explains that justice requires the 
operation of the reconciliation mechanism to be shorter in period. Failure to operate within 
the shortest possible timeframe would result in many negative consequences. To avoid any 
repercussions in its performance, it is essential that the reconciliation mechanism operates 
sooner and conclude the structural violence within the society.  
 
Conclusion 
Implementing a post-conflict reconciliation mechanism involves a rigorous process. 
This is marked by the difficulty in (correctly) identifying the aim of reconciliation, and 
necessary requirements for achieving reconciliation. There could be several aims for a 
reconciliation mechanism. Amongst them, addressing the increased structural violence in 
the post-conflict society is imperative. Once the increased structural violence is properly 
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addressed, it is possible to achieve the goals of reconciliation. For the purpose of mitigating 
the increased structural violence, a reconciliation mechanism should consider the basic 
human needs of the victims. This is because when basic human needs are unmet by one 
group in the society, there is structural inequality leading to structural violence. One viable 
mean of addressing this problem is the capabilities approach. This approach suggests two 
requirements: increased political participation and economic development of the victims of 
the conflict. In addition to these two requirements, an added requirement is suggested to 
implement these requirements in a reasonable timeframe. This is because when a long time 
is taken, negative consequences will emerge. Delay will ultimately result in weakening the 
reconciliation mechanism and might also result in the re-emergence of armed violence. 
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Chapter 3 – Reconciliation through classical mechanisms  
Introduction 
Every individual has an obligation under international law not to commit crimes that 
are international in nature. These individuals are responsible to the international 
community at large and they cannot use state sovereignty as a shield.208 These obligations 
come under four main categories: (1) genocide, (2) war crimes, (3) crimes against humanity 
and (4) crime of aggression.209 The United Nations has developed several mechanisms to 
enforce the responsibilities that appear under these categories. These institutions are the 
products of various political compromises.210 Various international criminal tribunals 
(including hybrid courts) are an example. There are certain structural problems within the 
system of international criminal tribunals.211 Failure to achieve reconciliation and delivering 
only a retributive form of justice are some of the main problems. To overcome these 
problems, and to deliver some restorative form of justice, several other frameworks were 
introduced. Truth commissions and reparation programs are amongst them.  
A UNHCR resolution dated 16th September 2015,212 urged the Sri Lankan government 
to establish a truth commission and a hybrid international court to achieve reconciliation.213 
Both these mechanisms are seen by the international community as important mechanisms 
for transitional justice.214 However, the potential of these mechanisms to deliver ‘thick’ 
reconciliation is doubtful.215 Implementation of these mechanisms alone did not produce 
the expected outcome of reconciliation in previous situations.  
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that truth commissions and hybrid 
courts, as proposed by the UNHCR resolution, are unlikely to achieve reconciliation in Sri 
Lanka. Chapter 2 of this thesis proposed that, to achieve reconciliation increased structural 
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violence in a given society should be mitigated.216 This chapter will demonstrate that the 
system of truth commissions and hybrid courts cannot effectively address increased 
structural violence. For this purpose, the chapter is organized in two sections. The first 
section analyses the system of truth commissions. It starts by introducing the notion of 
truth commissions and their positive impacts. Next, it demonstrates that truth commissions 
alone cannot achieve reconciliation. Then it examines the notion of timeliness introduced in 
the second chapter and examines whether truth commissions can work within a reasonable 
timeframe to achieve reconciliation. Through this analysis, this chapter demonstrates that 
truth commissions alone cannot achieve thick reconciliation.   
The second section starts with a brief introduction of the notion of hybrid courts. It 
then demonstrates that hybrid courts are designed to achieve a retributive form of justice, 
namely criminal justice. It then demonstrates that as a criminal justice mechanism, hybrid 
courts are unlikely to achieve restorative justice by way of reconciling the divided 
communities in a Third World country. The chapter ends with a brief conclusion. 
 
Section I – Truth commissions 
3.1 (a) Truth commissions: the reality 
Truth commissions, which serve the function of truth-seeking and truth-telling, are 
major elements of an international reconciliation mechanism.217 Over the past 25 to 30 
years, 30 countries have established truth commissions,218 in some cases as a process of 
acknowledgement,219 and in others as a process of apology and forgiveness.220 Hiding the 
truth from the victims and survivors is regarded as a violation of international law.221 For 
instance, the Preamble of the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons 
 
216 Chapter 2 Page 20-22 of this thesis. 
217 See the Rwandan, Timore Leste reconciliation mechanisms which where the international community truth-
telling as an element of reconciliation. The Trauma of Truth-telling: Effects of Witnessing in the Rwandan 
Gacaca Courts on Psychological Health, Journal of Conflict Resolution Karen Brounéus; Columbia Journal of 
Gender and Law ‘Truth and Reconciliation’: A Critical Step Toward Eliminating Race and Gender Violations in 
Tenure Wars Angela Mae Kupenda And Tamara F. Lawson. 
218 The ICRC ‘Truth commissions: A Schematic Overview’ (2006) 88 (862) International Review of the Red Cross, 
295. 
219 Martha Minow, ‘Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission’ 
(1998) 1 Negotiation Journal 338. 
220 Ibid. 
221 Gearoid Millar, Performative Memory and re-victimization: Truth-telling and provocation in Sierra Leone 
(2015) 8 (2), Journal of Memory studies 245. 
 43 
from Enforced Disappearance affirms that victims shall have the right to truth.222 In a 
resolution in 2012, the UN Human Rights Council emphasized the right to truth.223 The 
international community also affirms that the victims of violation of human rights have the 
right to truth and information. For instance, in 2010 the UN General Assembly proclaimed 
24th March as the International Day for the Right to the Truth concerning Gross Human 
Rights Violations.224 Right to truth has also been emphasized by international and regional 
legal bodies including the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights and Human Right Committee.225 Thus, it is clear that the 
international community identifies truth-seeking and truth-telling as a form of right to the 
victims and survivors.226  
The support of truth commissions by the international community is mainly due to 
the positive impact a truth commission can have on a post-conflict society. First, truth 
commissions allow the examination of past crimes. 227 Examining past crimes is important 
for preventing crimes in the future.228 This was demonstrated in a research done by Codepu 
– a Chilean human rights organization- with the assistance of the Association for the 
Prevention of Torture.229 Codepu completed a comparative analysis of five truth 
commissions in Argentina, Chile, El Salvador Guatemala and South Africa.230 This research 
demonstrated that every commission directed its proceedings towards preventive and 
promotional measures.231 This is because truth commissions can raise awareness.232 Truth 
commissions investigate the story of what has happened, and it is expected that the actual 
causes for the past abuses can be recognized. To prevent future violations, causes of past 
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abuses should be identified. In that way, a clear understanding of the reasons for the 
emergence of violence can be obtained and particular steps can be taken to avoid similar 
outbreaks of violence in the future.  
Secondly, transitional justice scholars argue that, truth commissions follow a 
“therapeutic process” which is essential to recover from the violent incidents of the past.233 
For this purpose, transitional justice scholars assert that truth-telling is healing.234 The term 
therapeutic process was first coined by Archbishop Desmond Tutu, a pioneer in the 
implementation of truth and reconciliation commission in South Africa.235 When a 
perpetrator, or the victim, testifies as to what happened the individual may feel relieved 
and satisfied.236 This is similar to the idea behind confession in Christianity.237 This process 
allows the victim or the survivor to forgive the incident. 
Truth commissions have also received some criticisms. Firstly, truth-seeking and 
truth-telling include a complicated and difficult process. For instance, some scholars identify 
that the success of this process lies in the creation of a collective memory.238 For these 
scholars, the collective memory will minimize the number of lies circulating as a public 
discourse.239 In reality, however, it is difficult to create a collective memory in a society 
where communities are deeply divided. In terms of collective memories, a shared 
perception towards the past that ensure group narratives is required.240  
This is a particular problem experienced in Sri Lanka due to the different claims 
made by different parties to the conflict. For instance, in Sri Lanka, Sinhalese claim that the 
war was commenced by the Tamils, whilst the Tamils claiming that the war was commenced 
by the Sinhalese.241 Also, a documentary made by Channel 4, a UK based television channel, 
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claimed that the government military has violated human rights of Tamil minorities.242 Tamil 
minorities in the Tamil held areas also tells the same.243 However, the government of Sri 
Lanka claims a different story, stating that the violations were conducted by the Tamil 
tigers. Sinhalese community also support this claim that the violations were conducted by 
the Tamil tigers.244 Hence, it is clear that each community has their own version of the past. 
Even though truth commissions establish a different version to their story, when the 
communities are divided, people may not accept the other version of the truth.  
Secondly, the idea of truth-telling as healing has not been systematically tested 
within the discipline.245 It has been argued that identifying the individual and national level 
influence of the therapeutic process is undefined.246 Also, it is not certain as to whether the 
victim, the survivor or the perpetrator feel better or worse after testifying. In fact, the New 
York Times in 1997 reported that 60% of the people who testified in the South African Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission felt worse after testifying.247  Even though Mendeloff asserts 
that truth-telling offers a sense of justice which is attached to the moral integrity to the 
victims, 248 it is still questionable whether the victims can recover from the emotional 
trauma.  
On the other, such a process would cause the victims, their relatives, and survivors 
emotional and psychological pain. As a result, they will be re-traumatised by reliving the 
violence they experienced. Gearoid Millar, in his 2015 article, emphasised that truth-seeking 
and truth-telling mechanism bring not help but provocation.249 The interviews he had with 
local people in Sierra Leone proves that the mechanism generated frustration, anger and 
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resentment rather than what was really expected: healing, reconciliation or justice.250 For 
one Sierra Leonean the truth-seeking mechanism was “adding pepper in my wound” whilst 
for another it was like “pouring hot water over your head.”251 Another explanatory 
comment provided by a Sierra Leonean who was a witness to the truth commission 
mentions that the truth commission is causing “only provocation to those that they seized 
advantage on during the war… because they just keep talking about it all the time, TRC, TRC, 
and I don’t see what they have done for us.”252 These statements show that the truth-
seeking and truth-telling mechanisms cause emotional difficulties rather than helping 
people to overcome the traumatic incidents of the past.  
Thirdly, some scholars argue that truth commissions can result in the recurrence of 
violent incidents.253 For instance, Mendeloff emphasises that truth-seeking sharpens the 
societal divisions which can end up in violence.254 Later in his writing, Mendeloff points out 
one possible reason for this claim. He provides that truth-seeking surveys were conducted 
with the participation of people who administer the reconciliation mechanism rather than 
the people who experienced the violence or subjected to the reconciliation process.255 For 
instance, Alfred Allan in his research does not assess the experience of the local population. 
Rather, Allan assesses the opinion of the staff of non-governmental organisations and truth 
commissions. 256  
Fourthly, some scholars establish that truth commissions are effective in post-
conflict democratic societies, not in fragile states. For instance, in “Post-Conflict Justice and 
Sustainable Peace” the authors identify that seeking truth would be an effective and 
successful mechanism in post-conflict democratic societies which have ‘durable peace in the 
core structure of their governance’. 257 In non-democratic societies, which has no durable 
peace, truth-seeking could have adverse impact the society. The problem with the majority 
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of post-conflict societies is that there is no democratic mechanism or has merely weak 
democratic mechanisms to govern the past atrocities.258 A state that experienced years of 
violence in its core structure is not likely to have a strong democratic framework. 
Furthermore, most armed conflicts in the post-cold war phase emerged from non-
democratic states rather than from democratic ones. This is supported by the analysis 
provided by Brahm who identifies that these states have negative impacts on democratic 
practices. 
Given these considerations, it is clear that truth commissions have both positive and 
negative outcomes.  In terms of establishing a successful reconciliation mechanism by way 
of a truth-seeking and truth-telling process, at least, two problems are identified.  
First, whether truth commissions address the problem of structural violence is 
doubtful. Chapter 2 to this thesis demonstrated that reconciliation and structural violence 
are interlinked, and to make reconciliation happen, increased structural violence should be 
mitigated.259 However, a truth commission does not mitigate the increased structural 
violence in a post-conflict society. Second, whether a truth commission can work within a 
reasonable timeframe is doubtful. Now this chapter turns to examine these two claims 
deeply. 
 
3.1 (b) Structural violence and truth commissions 
As chapter 2 established, structural inequality leading to increased structural 
violence should be addressed to achieve reconciliation.260 One major question with 
reference to a truth-seeking and truth-telling mechanism is, whether this mechanism helps 
address the increased structural violence in a post-conflict society. In order to assess 
whether truth-seeking and truth-telling helps addressing this problem, the aims of a truth 
commission must be examined. 
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Every truth commission has its own mandate and works towards different 
objectives.261 The mandate may depend, or be based, on the local circumstances and the 
purpose of the mechanism.262 These differing objectives can be categorised under three 
main areas:263 (1) to establish truth about crimes and events as a historical explanation, (2) 
protecting, recognising and restoring the rights of victims, and (3) positive social and 
political transformations.264 
The first aim of a truth commission is to make a historical explanation of the violent 
incidents experienced by the people.265 Mechanisms that are established with this mandate 
include a descriptive fact-finding process. This process takes cultural, historical and 
institutional factors of the past abuses and makes an explanatory account. The National 
Truth Commission in Brazil is a relevant example. The National Truth Commission Law 2011, 
which established the National Truth Commission in Brazil stipulates three main objectives 
of the Commission:266 (1) clarify the facts and circumstances for the violence (2) clarification 
of authorship for torture executions, forced disappearances and (3) identify the structure 
locations, institutions and circumstances for the violence.267 These aims require making an 
explanatory account of the past incidents. Through this, it is expected to create a collective 
memory of the past incidents accepted by every party to the conflict.  
Now, the question is whether making a historical explanation of the past abuses can 
address the increased structural violence in a post-conflict society. Chapter 2 established 
that increased social inequality in a post-conflict society, which may simply be termed as 
structural violence, leads to violent incidents.268 This is because there are certain structural 
factors in the society that cause inequality to the individuals, and these factors can create 
violence.269 In a post-conflict society the level of structural violence is high. To address 
increased structural violence, any mechanism should focus on addressing the 
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socioeconomic and political injustice in a given society.270 Chapter 2 has demonstrated that 
political participation and economic development of the victims are essential to address the 
increased structural violence in a post-conflict society.271  
The nexus between historical explanation of the past abuses and political 
participation of the victims is questionable. Political involvement requires the people to 
participate in the policy-making process in the political arena. Truth commission is not 
within the policy making process of a specific country. Also, truth commissions are not 
designed to achieve the purpose of increased political participation of the victims. Hence, 
victims’ participation in the truth commission as witnesses cannot be regarded as political 
participation.  However, a truth commission will not meet this requirement since they are 
designed to hear the grievances and the stories of the victims and perpetrators and no 
political decision will be made by such a mechanism. In fact, decisions made by truth 
commissions are non-binding in nature. Hence, it is less likely that the individuals get to 
involve in a decision-making process by participating in a reconciliation mechanism. 
The second aim of a truth commission is to protect, recognise and restore the rights 
of the victims.272 For instance, Edurado Gonzales identifies several rights that were 
implemented by truth commissions.273 This includes rights attached to dignity of the victims, 
wellbeing, psychological healing and improving the situation of the victims. In Peru, the 
Article 2 to the Supreme Decree of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 2001 detailed 
dignification of the victims and their family members as an important aim of the 
commission.  It is doubtful whether restoring the rights can help address increased 
structural violence. It is not sufficient for the mechanism only to focus on the rights of the 
victims. Rather, concerns regarding inequality must be addressed by the mechanism.  
Positive social and political transformations of the victims is the third aim of a truth 
commission. 274 After a violent incident, especially when the society has undergone serious 
human rights violations, it is difficult for the victims and survivors to get used to a 
democratic frame of governance. Even though democratic institutions are implemented, 
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people will not be ready for a democratic change. Hence, it is essential that positive social 
and political transformation happens in a post-conflict society. In Sierra Leone, the article 6 
to the Truth and Reconciliation Act provided that the purpose of establishing the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission is to “promote healing and reconciliation.” In the process of 
healing what is more essential is the social and political transformation of the victims. The 
victims’ attitude should change to a positive manner to make sure that healing takes place.  
 
3.1 (c) Timeliness and truth commissions  
A successful reconciliation mechanism must work within a reasonable timeframe.275 
Practically, truth commissions take a considerable time to operate. This is demonstrated in 
every aspect of the truth commission including establishment, implementation and working 
towards the recommendations. 276 This is due to the nature and scope of its work: testifying 
the stories of the victims, survivors and perpetrators, verifying the testimonies in terms of 
the evidence available and providing amnesties to the victims and survivors. Implementing a 
truth commission for truth-seeking and truth-telling also takes an extended period of time. 
The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, in its 2006 
report, emphasises the lengthy process of establishing a truth commission in general.277 This 
report demonstrates that prior to the establishment of a truth commission, several 
measures should be taken at the national level. This will include, “workshops, seminars and 
opportunities to debate and suggest specific components of mandate and design.”278 There 
could be a series of workshops for the same subject.279 It is the same with seminars and 
debates. According to the mandate provided by these events, the structure of the truth 
commission has to be designed. Hence, the initial stage of implementing a truth commission 
generally consumes a considerable time period. 
The time-consuming nature of a truth commission is also demonstrated in the 
operation of the truth commissions. There were approximately forty-five major 
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reconciliation processes held between 1974 and 2016.280 These processes have taken an 
extended period of time to operate. For instance, in Uganda the Commission of Inquiry into 
Violations of Human Rights (the truth commission) was implemented in May 1986.281 
Covering 608 deponents,282 this commission revealed the incidents for the period of 
October 1962 to January 1986. The commission operated almost a decade and the final 
report was completed in 1995. Further, the Rwandan transitional justice mechanism 
demonstrates the time consumption of a truth-seeking mechanism. The genocide of 
Rwanda officially commenced with the shooting down of the plane in which the President 
Juvenal Habyarimana travelled in April 1994. ICTR continued its trials until 2014 and reports 
show that some evidence was collected even at a later stage. This shows that even 20 years 
after the violence, the mechanism continued with truth-seeking. Also, the Rwandan 
mechanism had no separate body for truth seeking and truth telling.283 Instead, a historical 
explanation of the past abuses was done by the tribunal proceedings itself. This mechanism 
was operated for a period of two decades and it has proven that (even) two decades is 
insufficient for truth-seeking and truth-telling.  
The completion of the report of the truth commission does not mean that the 
mission of the truth commission is completed. The reconciliation mechanism can take 
further time to deliver the ultimate outcome. In some cases, even after delivering the 
report, the truth commission operated to investigate further actions. For instance, in South 
Africa, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was implemented in 1995.284 It consisted of 
four national members and three international members and covered the gross violations of 
human rights for the period of 1960 to 1994. Even though the commission has completed its 
primary reports in 1998, it operated for several further years to complete amnesty hearings. 
As a result, the overall agenda took an extended period of time.  
The positive outcome of truth commissions is undoubted. However, the impact of 
truth commissions towards reconciliation is doubted. Particularly, truth commissions tend 
not to address the problem of structural violence which is central to reconciliation. 
Furthermore, truth commissions can take a long period to operate, making it more 
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challenging to solve the reconciliation problem. Further, such mechanism brings emotional 
and psychological pain rather than being a psychological therapy. In some cases, this 
mechanism re-traumatises the victims spreading fear and vengeance causing more trouble. 
Thus, it can be concluded that truth commissions alone cannot achieve reconciliation, and it 
must be supplemented with an alternative mechanism. 
 
Section II – Hybrid courts 
Some countries use criminal prosecution in combination with truth commissions to 
address mass human rights violations.285 For instance, In Sierra Leone and East Timor truth 
commissions were designed to complement criminal proceedings.286 In its resolution to Sri 
Lanka,287 the United Nations also urged the implementation of a hybrid court (in addition to 
a truth commission) to comply with criminal prosecutions.288  
Simply, a hybrid court is a criminal justice system which is implemented in consultation 
with domestic and international communities for the examination of serious violations of 
human rights. The notion of a hybrid court was introduced to international criminal law at 
the end of 1990s.289 In East Timor first and then in Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Cambodia and 
other post-conflict countries, a series of hybrid courts were implemented.290 When the 
domestic government has inadequate local capacity to deal with past abuses, or the 
credibility of the domestic courts are impugned, a hybrid court is often recommended.291 
This system differs from ad hoc criminal tribunals, like the ICTR and ICTY. Because, ad hoc 
criminal tribunals claim international dominance over the national courts and they tend not 
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to follow the domestic rules.292 In contrast, hybrid courts are often implemented with 
domestic consultation. As a result, hybrid courts tend to accept the domestic sovereignty to 
a certain extent.  
This system has a feasible mechanism to combat impunity; because criminal prosecution 
can be utilized to deter perpetrators of crimes.293 However, it is doubtful whether this 
mechanism can be utilized to promote reconciliation in a post conflict society. Now this 
chapter turns to examine the notion of hybrid courts and their impact in promoting 
reconciliation.  
 
3.2 (a) The notion of hybrid courts  
Hybrid court, as its name implies, has a structure which is mixed with international and 
national elements. In terms of the institutional apparatus, staff (mainly judges and 
prosecutors) and the applicable law, these tribunals have a mixed system.294 Both 
international community and domestic community assist in the implementation and running 
of these courts. As a result, decisions that are delivered from hybrid courts have a form of 
mixed justice.295 Given that hybrid courts have features of both domestic and international 
courts, it is expected that the deficiencies of both international and domestic courts can be 
mitigated and the benefits of the two systems can be retained. 296 Hence; hybrid court is 
suggested as an improved mechanism to provide sufficient attention to domestic factors 
like staff (judges, prosecutors and other staff) and domestic laws while international norms 
and resources can also be implemented at the same time.297 
Two main advantages have resulted in the increased acceptance of hybrid courts by the 
international community: (a) local ownership of the criminal justice system and (b) 
proximity to the crimes.298 Compared to the international military tribunals (including the 
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International Criminal Court) and ad hoc criminal tribunals, hybrid courts allow the 
advancement of the domestic criminal justice system.299 This happens mainly due to two 
factors. On the one hand, the increased emphasis given to the domestic factors by this 
system allows for local ownership.300 On the other, hybrid courts are implemented within 
the domestic mechanism itself, rather than in an international setting. As a result, it is likely 
that the local population experience their representation in the system.301 Besides, hybrid 
courts are implemented in the domestic jurisdiction where the atrocities took place. Hence, 
people’s proximity to the system is very high. 
Despite these benefits, hybrid courts also face certain challenges. Reconciling the 
international law and domestic law is one central challenge encountered by hybrid courts. 
302 This is because, sometimes the domestic law contradicts international law. To reconcile 
the two legal systems, hybrid courts should carefully consider both the legal systems. For 
instance, the UN Secretary General’s Guidance Note for Transitional Justice emphasises the 
importance of considering the unique country contexts in the process of implementing a 
transitional justice process.303 Accordingly, the domestic reforms should be supported, and 
national human rights institutes should be given a considerable attention.  In terms of thick 
reconciliation, reconciling the domestic law and international law is important. As explained 
in the chapter 1, thick reconciliation requires to address the structural causes for 
discrimination and marginalization.304 For this, specific legal provisions in the domestic 
system must be reformed. This process takes a considerable effort. For instance, hybrid 
court in East Timor experienced difficulties in identifying the applicable legislation that is 
consistent to international legal standards.305 This is because, a specific regulation provided 
that the law of East Timor would apply in the SPSC as long as it does not contradict with 
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international legal standards.306 As a result, a huge effort was taken by the legal experts to 
reconcile the problem between the intersection of domestic law and international law.307  
Capacity building is another central challenge experienced by the system of hybrid 
courts. Capacity building includes strengthening justice and rule of law in the domestic 
jurisdiction for delivering justice and public confidence in the long run.308 This means that 
the hybrid court must ensure tangible capacity building within the victims. For this, victims 
must have faith in the justice institutions; because as long as the public have faith and trust 
in the justice institutions, it is easier to implement a new criminal justice mechanism to try 
the perpetrators. However, building public trust and faith towards the justice institutes is a 
long process which should be developed within the justice institutes themselves. In post-
conflict fragile states, justice institutions tend to take a corrupt form and the public trust is 
low. For instance, Cerone and Baldwin argue that judges were unable to build up an 
impartial system of legislation in post-conflict societies. 309 This means that the international 
judges did not increase the capacity of the domestic court system.310 This can also result in 
having low public trust of the people.  
The main question for this thesis, however, is whether hybrid courts can help address 
the problem of reconciliation in a post-conflict society. Clearly, as a criminal prosecution 
mechanism the main purpose of establishing a hybrid court is retributive justice. It has long 
been established that criminal prosecution cannot be utilized to attain social stability.311 For 
instance, criminal prosecutions were conducted for more than ten years in South Africa.312 
However, the impact of these mechanisms on social stability and reconciling intergroup 
hostilities were unnoticeable.313 This research has identified at least three main factors that 
a criminal justice system can result in restricting intergroup reconciliation in a post-conflict 
society. 
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Firstly, it is difficult for a criminal justice system to address the problems which were 
caused by the civil war. Particularly, in the aftermath of the civil war, victims experience 
severe socio-economic problems. For instance, international reports indicate that civil war 
caused more than 90,000 people in the North and the East of Sri Lanka to be displaced.314 
The Sri Lankan civil war devastated houses and infrastructure facilities. The livelihood of the 
victims was heavily affected by the war and that caused severe poverty problems.315 Some 
news reports further indicate that post-conflict justice institutions tend to be corrupt. These 
corrupt institutions can cause severe problems for the victims to seek justice through these 
institutions.316 A criminal justice system which would be established to try the perpetrators 
of mass human rights violations cannot be used to address problems of displacement and 
poverty.  
Secondly, criminal trials can bring adverse impacts on social relationships. For instance, 
Benjamin Fink rightfully analyses that retribution causes the individuals to accuse and 
counter accuse the individuals which may sacrifice the possibility of reconciliation.317 Put 
simply, a criminal justice system allows the victims to prosecute the alleged perpetrators. In 
this process, victims risk being retraumatized by the bad incidents they underwent and that 
can adversely affect the restorative justice process to achieve reconciliation. This thesis 
does not refuse the criminal justice processes which is important to deter the future crimes. 
However, before implementing such process, the socio-economic and political status of the 
victims must be properly addressed. Criminal justice process should be implemented as the 
second step, once the socio-economic and political wellbeing of the victims are ensured.  
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Conclusion 
The international community recognises truth commissions and hybrid courts as two 
major means of achieving transitional justice. In terms of the type of justice sought, these 
two mechanisms are different. While hybrid courts focus on retributive justice, truth 
commissions aim for a restorative form of a justice. However, both mechanisms are 
expected to reconcile divided communities in a post-conflict society. Both of these 
mechanisms offer some benefits to the transitional justice process. From being a 
therapeutic process to making a historical explanation of past incidents, truth commissions 
assist the transitional justice process. Hybrid courts are useful as a system of justice linked 
to the local population. Also, the benefits of both a domestic mechanism and an 
international investigation is offered by a hybrid court.  
Despite these benefits, the contribution of these mechanisms to achieve ‘thick’ 
reconciliation in a post-conflict society is limited. Truth commissions, though intend to 
achieve a restorative form of a justice but do not focus on the problem of increased 
structural violence that is central to any reconciliation process. Also, the excessive time 
period taken by a truth commission to operate can negatively affect efforts towards 
reconciliation.  
Hybrid courts, on the other hand, do not intend to achieve a restorative form of a 
justice. Rather they aim to bring criminal justice in a post-conflict society. Whilst, criminal 
justice is important, it alone cannot address the problem of reconciliation. There are few 
other problems that restrict effort for reconciliation through a criminal justice system. Not 
answering the problems caused by the civil war and bringing adverse impacts on social 
relationships can result in restricting efforts for reconciliation. Similar to truth commissions, 
hybrid courts can also take a considerable time to operate. Given the circumstances, it can 
be concluded that whilst truth commissions and hybrid courts are important for a 
transitional justice mechanism, these mechanisms must be supported by an alternative 
mechanism that will enable ‘thick’ reconciliation in a post-conflict society.  
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Chapter 4 - Power sharing experience and reconciliation: Lessons for Sri Lanka 
 
Introduction  
Chapter 2 proposed that victims of war should have increased political participation 
to achieve reconciliation. This is because, lack of attention given to the political demands of 
minority groups has been a serious concern in multicultural societies.318 Chapter 3 
demonstrated that classical mechanisms for reconciliation experience serious shortcomings 
in increasing the political participation of the victims and reconciling the divided 
communities. To overcome this problem, this thesis proposes the implementation of an 
additional mechanism. As explained in previous chapters, there is deep inequality in divided 
communities. Legal and political scholarship has suggested several means to address this 
inequality. One of the most viable means is the establishment of a power sharing 
mechanism.319 This chapter advances the idea that a power sharing mechanism can help 
achieving the central objective of this research, which is to propose a successful 
reconciliation mechanism for Sri Lanka, that would particularly address its Third World 
conditions  
For a country like Sri Lanka, where different ethnicities live in different regions, a 
power sharing mechanism tends to give the minority groups the access to state power 
through a provincial mechanism. In this way, every ethnic group may receive the 
opportunity to reach their communal goals and interests. Also, this system can assist in 
addressing the unaddressed political problems and demands of minority groups. Having 
addressed the political problems of the minority groups (and with equal representation in 
domestic politics) it is less likely for them to have antipathy against the majority ethnic 
groups. As a result, the problem of structural violence and the problem of reconciliation can 
be better addressed by a power sharing mechanism.320 Previous chapters have established 
the idea that the central problem that restricts reconciliation in a Third World post-conflict 
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society is structural violence. Thus, this chapter demonstrates that a strong power sharing 
mechanism helps addressing this central problem in a Third World country.  
This chapter is organised in three sections. The first section identifies the existing 
power sharing mechanism in Sri Lanka and identifies the weaknesses of that system. 
Following that, the second section to the chapter introduces the fundamental principles of 
power sharing. Then it examines the reasons for implementing a power sharing mechanism 
for political participation and reconciliation. By analysing the weaknesses of the Sri Lankan 
power sharing mechanism and identifying the elements of power sharing, the third section 
proposes recommendations for a successful power sharing mechanism in Sri Lanka. 
 
Section I – Existing Power Sharing Mechanism in Sri Lanka 
4.1 (A) Efforts to implement a power sharing mechanism in Sri Lanka and weaknesses 
The concept of power sharing is not new to the legal, political and constitutional 
structure of Sri Lanka. Since colonial rule, the British have implemented power sharing 
provisions in the Sri Lankan constitutional structure. The first constitutional reform provided 
by the British to Sri Lanka, the Colebrook Cameron Reforms of 1833 included power sharing 
principles to a certain extent. This is evident from the fact that the legislative power was 
divided among the British and the Sri Lankans.321 This legislative power of the Sri Lankans 
was further shared between the Sinhalese, the Tamils and the Burghers. The subsequent 
constitutional reforms introduced by the British: the Crewe-McCullum Reforms of 1912, the 
Manning Reforms of 1922, the Manning – Devonshire Reforms of 1924, and the Soulbury 
Constitution of 1948 further expanded the power sharing principles by increasing the 
number of representatives in the legislative councils. For instance, in terms of the Colebrook 
Cameron reforms, three members represented around 6500 Europeans, whilst around 
2,550,000 Sinhalese were represented by two members and 1,125,000 Tamils, 250,000 
Muslims, 25,000 Burghers were represented by one member for each ethnic group.322 Since 
sufficient representation was not available under Colebrook Cameron reforms, later reforms 
increased the number of representatives for the legislative council. In that sense, the British 
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reforms tried to provide some access to legislative power for every ethnic group.  
After independence (1948), several efforts were made to implement a power sharing 
mechanism in Sri Lanka. One of these efforts is the bringing up of the idea of “Tamil 
Homeland” by the Federal Party (Tamil based political party) in 1950s.323 The then Prime 
Minister. S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike tried in this way to address the Sinhalese-Tamil violence 
which emerged after the implementation of Official Languages Act. Accordingly, 
Bandaranaike negotiated with Tamil parties and agreed to devolve power to regional 
councils.324 However, this attempt was not successful due to the continuous agitations held 
by the Sinhalese patriotic society (including the Buddhist monks) against the decision of the 
Prime Minister.  
Another striking effort was the Devolution Bill proposed by the then President 
Chandrika Kumarathunga in 2000. This bill proposed the establishment of a quasi-federal 
union of regions and to implement a mixed voting system.325 It also proposed to devolve 
responsibilities and powers attached to important areas like finance, law and land to the 
quasi federal union of regions.326 This bill would have resulted in high level political 
autonomy for the Northern Tamils.327 However, it was not enacted into law because 
President Kumarathunge did not achieve the necessary two-third majority in Parliament.328 
Thus, it is clear that efforts to bring power sharing mechanisms to Sri Lanka was not 
supported by majority of population.  
The most prominent effort to implement power sharing principles in Sri Lanka is the 
implementation of the 13th amendment to the Second Republican Constitution of 1978 
which was enacted in 1987. This chapter now turns to examine the existing laws that 
stipulates power sharing principles in Sri Lanka, including the 13th amendment. 
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4.1 (B) The current legislation on power sharing in Sri Lanka 
The existing legislation that regulates power sharing principles in Sri Lanka is the 13th 
amendment to the constitution and the Provincial Councils Act No. 42 of 1987. These 
statutes establish a similar structure to the Indian model but support a constitutionally-
entrenched unitary system.329 Article 154 (a), as entrenched by the 13th amendment, 
provides that each province in Sri Lanka shall have a Provincial Council,330 and the members 
for each province shall be elected by way of a Provincial Council election.331 The election 
must be held according to the provisions stipulated under the Provincial Council Election Act 
No. 2 of 1988. The number of members to the Provincial Councils will be determined by the 
area and the population of each province.332 In terms of these legislations, the then 
President J.R Jayawardane in 1988 established Provincial Councils for the first time in the 
nine provinces in Sri Lanka by order 3RI.333 Due to administrative difficulties and influences 
of the terrorism, some of the Provincial Councils including the Northern Provincial Council 
was not operating. After the Northern Provincial Council election held in 2013, the total of 
nine Provincial Councils are currently in effect.  
The constitution provides that each Provincial Council shall have a Governor,334 a 
Chief Minister and a Board of Ministers.335 Article 154P of the Second Republican 
Constitution (as entrenched by the 13th Amendment) provides for the establishment of a 
High Court for every Province, where the judges to these courts will be nominated by the 
Chief Justice (of the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka).336 The Constitution also provides that a 
Provincial Council continues for a period of five years unless dissolved by the Governor 
beforehand.337  
In order to make clear the powers vested in the national government and the 
Provincial Councils, the Thirteenth Amendment has created three lists under the Ninth 
Schedule of the Constitution: Provincial Council List, Reserved List and the Concurrent 
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List.338 The Provincial Council List recorded the powers vested solely on the Provincial 
Council which includes: implementation of provincial economic plans and development 
plans, education, local authorities for the purpose of village administration and local 
government, housing and construction, roads and bridges, agriculture, social services, co-
operative undertakings and rehabilitation.339 The reserved list provides for the powers 
retained by the central government340 and retained a large number of important powers 
that are essential for the running of the government. Foreign affairs, justice and defence are 
amongst them. The concurrent list details the powers shared between the national 
government and the provincial government.341 This includes, planning, education, higher 
education, social services and rehabilitation. In the event where the decisions of the 
provincial councils contradict with the decisions of the national government, the choice of 
the national government prevails.342 
 
4.1 (C) Weaknesses of the existing mechanism 
These provisions display some qualities of a good power sharing mechanism. 
However, there are a number of factors that restricts a successful power sharing mechanism 
in Sri Lanka. Firstly, the thirteenth amendment assigned only a limited number of powers 
and responsibilities to the Provincial Councils including rural development and provincial 
development. These limited powers are also restricted by various other legal provisions 
implemented by a statute of the national Parliament. For instance, the ‘Divineguma Bill’ 
implemented in 2013,343 and National Transport Commission Act No. 37 of 1991 can be 
identified.   
The Divineguma Bill included subjects like rural development, implementation of 
development plans, rehabilitation, co-operative undertakings and agriculture. Each of these 
subjects comes under the Provincial Council List. By including them, the Divineguma Bill has 
allowed the national government to access those subjects.344 In this way, the national 
government has used an alternative way to access the powers of the Provincial Council 
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without amending the thirteenth amendment. In terms of Article 154 (G) of the 
Constitution, in the event where the decisions of the National Government and Provincial 
councils are inconsistent, decision of the National Government prevail. As a result, powers 
that are originally vested on Provincial Councils were dissolved and the national government 
has taken excessive power over these provisions. For another example, item eight of the 
Provincial Council List provides powers to enforce laws pertain to road passenger carriage 
services. This power was restricted by the enforcement of the National Transport 
Commission Act No. 37 of 1991 by the national Parliament.345 
Secondly, the position of the Governor limits the exercise of the powers by the 
Provincial Councils. On the one hand, Governor has obtained excess power in his hands and 
acts like the head of a Provincial Council. A bill passed by the Provincial Council requires the 
Governor’s assent for it to be enforced as a statute.346 The Governor also has the discretion 
to return it to be reconsidered, with or without any recommendations for amendment.347 
Even after the bill is amended and presented for the assent of the Governor (for the second 
time), he has the discretion to reserve it for the reference of the President of the Supreme 
Court, to inquire whether the bill is consistent with the provisions of the constitution.348 As 
a result, the Governor acts as a check on the legislative powers of the Provincial Councils.349 
In addition to this, the Governor also has the power to prorogue the Provincial Council from 
time to time,350 to dissolve the Provincial Council,351 and to pardon convicted persons within 
the Governor’s province.352 These provisions grant excessive power to the Governor and 
limits the powers of the Provincial Councils.  
Furthermore, the Governor is likely to act according to the will of the President of 
the National Government. In terms of Article 154 (B) (2) of the Constitution, the Governor 
for each Provincial Council is appointed by the President of the national government and 
holds office ‘during the pleasure of the President.’353 Fort this reason, the Governor is a 
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representative of the President of the National Government in the Provincial Councils. There 
are situations where the Governors were expressly ordered to obey the will of the President 
of the National Government. For instance, when the Governor Bakeer Marker did not obey 
the orders of the President, the President threatened: “get ready to relinquish the 
governorship.”354 As a result “the Governor reluctantly agreed to do as the President 
wished.”355  
Thirdly, the powers and responsibilities detailed in the three lists are sometimes 
unclear. This is because some of the responsibilities are scheduled in two lists. For instance, 
responsibilities like agriculture, social services and rehabilitation are listed under both 
Provincial Council List and Concurrent List. Hence, both the national government and 
Provincial Councils have equal (yet unclear) power on the same subject and that results in 
confusion. Also, since the constitution provides that the decision of the national 
government shall prevail at any event of inconsistency, it is highly likely for the national 
government to influence the Provincial Councils. While both the national government and 
Provincial Councils have institutions for implementation of laws there is no consensual 
decision-making process. Hence, neither the national government nor the Provincial 
Councils are aware of the policies of their counterparts. For instance, most of the Provincial 
Councils have a ministry for Agriculture/ Agrarian Development in addition to the Ministry 
of Agriculture in the National Government. Over the last few years, various problems 
emerged in terms of agriculture in Sri Lanka.356 One major reason for this is the 
contradictory decisions taken by the national government and the Provincial Councils due to 
lack of awareness of each other’s processes. 
For another example, most of the Provincial Councils have a Ministry for children’s 
and women’s affairs. The national government runs the Ministry of Women and Child Affairs 
whilst a number of other institutes have been established for the same purpose, including 
the National Child Protection Authority, the Department of Probation and Childcare 
Services, the Children’s Secretariat and the Women’s Bureau. However, there is no process 
to make consensus decisions between the national government and the Provincial Councils. 
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Any decisions by the provincial ministries can be overruled by the national government 
ministries in order to pursue their own agenda. The main impact of this is the failure of the 
initiatives of both the national government and the Provincial Councils.  
 This is evident from the response of the Delegation of the Provincial Councils at the 
Conference of Provincial Councils on a New Devolution Settlement for Sri Lanka which was 
held on 6th and 7th August 2016.357 Following this, the Centre for  Policy Alternatives 
published a document to analyse the result of the conference which details the opinion and 
recommendations of the Provincial Councils individually.358 All the Provincial Councils 
individually mentioned that the decisions of the National Government influence the policies 
of the Provincial Councils. Western Province also mentioned that the Chief Minister 
experiences various political challenges in the exercise of his power. Western Province also 
mentioned that policies regarding the Provincial Councils are made by the national 
government without consulting the Provincial Councils.359 Uva Province recommendations 
specify that the national plans of the central government interferes the plans of the 
Provincial Councils. This recommendation also specifies certain policies of the national 
government (for example: Divineguma, Maganeguma and Samurdhi). 
This document indicates that the members of the Provincial Councils are not 
satisfied with the powers and responsibilities they possess. Also, confusion between the 
national government and the Provincial Councils is likely to emerge. That may result in the 
failure of the government administration causing difficulties for the people in Sri Lanka. As a 
result, it is clear that the legal provisions introduced to Sri Lanka for the purposes of power 
sharing comprising of the 13th amendment to the Second Republican Constitution of 1978 
and the Provincial Councils Act No. 42 of 1987 are not effective.  
 
Section II – Fundamental Principles of Power Sharing 
4.2 (a) Introducing the elements  
As the introductory section demonstrated, a power sharing mechanism can be 
described as a political solution implemented in a multicultural society which divides the 
governmental responsibilities among different communal groups to represent rival political 
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interests in the government. Since there is no consensus among scholars on power sharing, 
for the purpose of this research, the Oxford English dictionary definition for power sharing is 
used. It provides two definitions for power sharing: “the sharing among rival political 
interests of governmental responsibilities” and “a policy for such sharing agreed between 
parties or within coalitions.”360 Through these definitions it is clear that power sharing refers 
to a mechanism which shares the responsibilities of the government between different 
groups who have different interests.  
As pointed out above, the Sri Lankan power sharing mechanism allows certain 
governmental responsibilities to be shared between rival political interests. Also, 
considering the thirteenth amendment as an agreement, the Tamils and the Sinhalese have 
agreed to the provisions in the thirteenth amendment.  However, it has been shown above 
that such mechanism has failed to address the political demands of the minority Tamils in 
Sri Lanka. Hence, it is clear that simply sharing the government responsibilities will not 
provide a successful power sharing mechanism. The problem lies with the mechanism by 
which the power sharing system is implemented. The work of Lijphart is helpful in this 
regard. 
Lijphart in his 2002 article, “Negotiation Democracy versus Consensus Democracy: 
Parallel Conclusions and Recommendations” introduces four major elements of power 
sharing: (a) executive power sharing, (b) group autonomy (c) proportional representation 
and (d) mutual veto. Out of these four, Sri Lanka has implemented proportional 
representation. Before examining the unimplemented principles, this chapter first examines 
the established proportional representation principle.  
Sri Lanka is amongst the oldest democracies in South Asia.361 It implemented 
universal suffrage as early as in 1931.362 Since then, Sri Lanka resorted to a whole variety of 
electoral mechanisms. Initially Sri Lanka had ‘first past the post’ electoral system and single 
transferable vote system.363 First past the post is the simplest form of voting process 
implemented in a number of commonwealth countries including Canada and the United 
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Kingdom.364 This mechanism allows each voter to vote for his/her preferred candidate. The 
candidate who receives the highest number of votes in a particular electoral division is 
elected. Single transferable vote system is an extended version of this system. Under single 
transferable vote system voters can nominate their preferences in the poll as first priority 
and second priority.  
The weakness of these systems is that, it does not represent the majority opinion. 
The reason is that sometimes the highest number of votes does not mean that the 
candidate received the majority of the total number of votes. For instance, in a particular 
electoral division named XYZ with ten voters, three candidates (A, B and C) compete for one 
seat of that electoral division. One candidate (A) receives four out of ten votes. The other six 
votes have been casted equally upon the remaining two candidates (three for B and three 
for C). The majority of votes (six out of ten) are against the candidate A. However, since he 
received the highest number of votes, under first past the post electoral system he is 
elected as the member for the legislature. Even under the single transferable vote system, 
when there is only one seat allocated per electoral division, there is no chance for the 
second preference. Hence, this type of a situation tends to ignore the majority opinion. 
This system also challenges the fair representation of minority ethnic groups in the 
legislature. Put simply, in the above example, B is a candidate from a minority group who 
has received three out of ten votes. This means the minority people have casted 3% of votes 
in favour of their group.  In the ten proceeding electoral divisions also, the minority Tamil 
candidates received a similar response in the election making around 30% votes in favour of 
their group. However, since they have not received the highest votes in a particular 
electoral division their representation in the legislature is 0%.  
Given that Sri Lanka implemented this system, the minority groups have received a 
minimum representation in the legislature.365 As a result, under the 1978 constitution Sri 
Lanka has implemented a proportional representation system. Proportional representation 
is a system where different political parties gain seats in proportion to the number of votes 
they receive. Lijphart identifies that proportional representation is associated with 
“multiparty systems, coalition governments and more equal executive-legislative power 
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relations.”366 Since different groups representing different ethnic groups can be elected, the 
end result of proportional representation is the split of power into separate groups. As a 
result, it is more likely that a multi-party system will be formed with a coalition cabinet.367  
Take the Sri Lankan case study for example. There are 225 seats allocated in the Sri 
Lankan Parliament.368 Out of the 225, 196 members are elected by the people in a general 
election and the remaining 29 are elected as National List MPs in proportionate to the 
number of votes each party receives in the general election.369 To form a government, one 
political party requires at least 113 seats in the Parliament. The statistics indicate that in the 
current Parliament, the 225 members are represented by six political parties.370 106 
members from the United National Party, 95 members from United People’s Freedom 
Alliance, 16 from Illankai Tamil Arasu Kadchi (minority Tamil party) and 6 seats for People’s 
Liberation Front. One seat is equally won by the Eelam People’s Democratic Party (minority 
Tamil party) and Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (minority Muslim party).371  
As per these statistics, the proportional representation system has allowed a multi-
party system. Also, none of the parties have received the required number of seats (113) to 
form a government. As a result, the United National Party and United People’s Freedom 
Alliance has established a coalition government. This system has also resulted in substantial 
representation for minority groups. Because of this reason, it is clear that Lijphart’s analysis 
(that proportional representation allows a multi-party system with coalition governments 
with minority representation) is correct. 
This is also clear from the Sri Lankan Parliament Election results of 2001. In this 
election the United National Party received 109 seats, People’s alliance received 77 seats, 
People’s Liberation Front received 16 seats. Tamil National Alliance, a minority Tamil party 
has received 15 seats in the Parliament whilst 5 other seats were received by a minority 
Muslim party, Sri Lanka Muslim Congress. Another minority Tamil party Eelam People’s 
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Democratic Party has received 2 seats in the parliament whilst one seat is won by the 
Democratic People’s Liberation Front which is also a Tamil minority party. Given that none 
of the political parties have received 113 seats to form a government, the United National 
Party and People’s Alliance formed a coalition government.372 
Even though a coalition cabinet brings the disadvantage of a weak government, it 
allows the creation of a multi-ethnic government. As a result, different opinions 
representing different ethnic groups are represented in the government and in the 
legislature. In particular, Lijphart emphasizes the importance of a coalition government via a 
proportional representation mechanism in an ethnically divided community. Whilst giving 
specific reference to the opinion of the minority ethnic groups, working with majority ethnic 
parties in the coalition government will also bring the advantage of working together with 
different ethnic groups.  
Thus, it is clear that proportional representation is an established principle in Sri 
Lanka. Hence, this section of the chapter does not make any recommendation or further 
analysis on the established principle. Instead, this chapter now turns to evaluate the rest of 
the principles proposed by Lijphart and other scholars.  
 
4.2. (B) Executive Power Sharing 
From the above analysis, it is clear that proportional representation tends to form a 
legislature with minority representation. As a result, minority groups have the opportunity 
to express their interests in Parliament. However, for the purpose of reconciliation minority 
representation in the legislature is inadequate. With 16 seats in Parliament Tamil minority 
groups faces difficulties in passing a bill in the Parliament. Hence, they cannot demand the 
executive to act on their behalf. Further, under the Provincial Council system the Governor 
acts as a watchdog and restricts their interests. Put simply, governors are appointed by the 
President (of the national government) and act like his representative. The constitution 
itself provides that the Governor stays at the President’s ‘pleasure’. With a wide array of 
powers placed in the Governor’s hands, the President tends to take control of the Provincial 
Councils. As a result, the President appoints a Governor who is trustworthy to him. There 
were several incidents that displayed autocracy of the President in the appointment of the 
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Governor. One such incident is the appointment of military Governors to the Northern and 
Eastern provinces in Sri Lanka. 
 In 2014, President Rajapakse appointed G.A. Chandrasiri, a retired Major General of 
the Sri Lankan army as the Governor of the Northern Province.373 Chandrasiri was the Chief 
of Staff of the Sri Lankan Army. This appointment has been criticised by the people of the 
Northern Province and representatives of the Northern Provincial Council.374 Despite the 
displeasure of the people and the representatives of the Northern Province, this 
appointment has been done twice in the recent history. Similarly, a retired Rear Admiral of 
the Sri Lankan Navy, Mohan Wijewickrema,  was appointed (twice) as the Governor of the 
Eastern Provincial Council by President Rajapakse.375 Wijewickrema was alleged for issuing 
circulars only in Sinhalese language despite the minority dominance in the Eastern 
Province.376 Also, for the minor grade to senior grade vacancies in the Eastern Provincial 
Council, Wijewickrema has only appointed only Southern Sinhalese despite the availability 
of suitable minority candidates in the Eastern Province.377  
Appointing a military personal to a position in the civil administration is 
controversial. This displays the interest of the ruling government in increased militarisation. 
Also, it demonstrates that the government intends to continue a military presence in a 
minority dominant area even after the end of a civil war. As a result, military involvement is 
expected in civil administration. This would further deepen the inequality problem. Put 
simply, Northern and Eastern Provinces have a minority dominance and have been deeply 
affected by the civil war.378 For every other province where the Sinhalese are the dominant, 
a civil Governor was appointed. However, for the provinces with a minority dominance, a 
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military governor was appointed. This demonstrates two different ways the national 
government treats the majority and minority communities. It also creates the public 
impression that the national government does not wish to unite with them. This is clear 
from the statement made by the Chief Minister of the Northern Province: “the ruling 
government is not willing to work united with the Tamil community.”379  
Secondly, the appointment of the (former) Governor of the Central Province was 
controversial. Central Province, a province with a major Buddhist dominance, tends to 
preserve the Buddhist culture. President Sirisena (current), in 2015 appointed, Niluka 
Ekanayake a transgendered as the Governor of the Province. Buddhist monks representing 
the Temple of the Tooth Relic have showed their displeasure against this appointment 
mentioning that “the Governor has to work with Buddhist monks and participate in religious 
ceremonies at the Temple of the Tooth Relic.”380 As a transgender person, Buddhist monks 
do not wish to accept her participation in the religious activities. Also, news reports indicate 
that she was convicted for several offences. For instance in 1997, when he was a man, he 
was pleaded guilty for impersonation.381 Also in 1998, he was charged for forgery.382 Hence, 
people did not want her to be appointed as the Governor of the central province and 
demanded another appointment. However, President Sirisena did not respond to these 
demands.  
In addition to this, the legislative enactments of the national Parliament also limit 
the powers of the Provincial Councils. For this reason, even though Tamil parties have the 
opportunity to make claims in the parliament, they cannot proceed forward with actions, 
since they do not have executive power.  
In order to address this problem, Lijphart proposes a second principle - power 
sharing in the executive arm of government.383 Here, Lijphart analyses that adequate 
alternative measures should be taken to allow minority parties to access the executive 
power.384 However, Lijphart is not clear on the alternative mechanism which provides 
access for the minority groups. Instead, in his 2004 article, “Constitutional Design for 
 
379 Sri Lanka Brief, above n 372. 
380 Colombo Telegraph, above n 376. 
381 Ibid. 
382 Ibid. 
383 Arend Lijphart, The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands (University of 
California Press, 1st edition 1968).; Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1st edition, 19. 
384 Ibid. 
 72 
Divided Societies” he provides several examples to analyse this principle.385 
Belgium’s constitutional provisions providing equal access for Flemish speaking and 
French speaking Belgians in the Cabinet is Lijphart’s first example. Since 1970s, Belgium 
experienced a language division (French and Flemish).386 As a solution for this, the Belgium 
constitution specifies that the Cabinet of Ministers should consist equally with Flemish 
speakers and French Speakers. As a result, both groups have equal representation in the 
executive. That means the executive power is shared between the two main communal 
groups. This example is useful to identify Lijphart’s principle on executive power sharing. 
However, there are certain difficulties in the application of this mechanism to the Sri Lankan 
problem. This is because of the demographic differences between Sri Lanka and Belgium. In 
Belgium, 59% of the total population are Flemish speakers whilst 40% are French speakers. 
Also, the French and Flemish speakers are well established throughout the state. However, 
in Sri Lanka this case is different. Whilst a majority of Tamils are restricted in the Northern 
and the Eastern regions of the island, the Sinhalese population is dominant in other regions. 
Also, Sri Lankan Tamil population is around 11.1%, and 74.9% of the total population are 
Sinhalese. For this reason, it is difficult to implement a 50-50 Tamil and Sinhalese cabinet in 
the government. 
The second example provided by Lijphart (in the same article) is much more relevant 
to the application of Sri Lankan case study. Lijphart takes the South African case study and 
explains that any political party (despite ethnic representation) who receives at least 
minimum 5% of the seats in the Parliament has the right to participate in the cabinet on a 
proportionate basis.387 This provision is similar to the proportional representation in 
selecting members to the Parliament, where candidates are elected to the Parliament in 
proportion to the votes they receive. For instance, 16 seats out of 225 are represented by 
Illankai Tamil Arasu Kadchi in the current Sri Lankan Parliament. If the South African 
mechanism is implemented, 36% of the members of the Cabinet should come from 
parliamentarians from this party. Accordingly, in a Cabinet of 50 Ministers, at least 2 
members should be represented by Illankai Tamil Arasu Kadchi. Accordingly, there would be 
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a mandatory provision to allow the minority parties to be part of the executive arm of 
government. 
This system can be observed in Northern Ireland as well. In Northern Ireland, the 
main political parties can become members of the permanent coalition government.388 
Decisions affecting Northern Ireland are taken by this coalition government which is 
represented by all the political parties. In that sense, this mechanism allows the executive 
power to be accessed by every party. Given that this is one major feature in representative 
democracy, every ethnic group is given the right to take part in the decision-making process 
of the government.  
In addition to these two methods there are several other ways to allow minority 
groups to access executive power. Implementing a vertical power sharing mechanism is one 
such way. In this regard, the notion of horizontal and vertical power sharing must be 
defined.  
Horizontal power sharing requires the state power to be shared among different 
government organs.389 This is similar to the separation of power principle found in the 
constitutional law theories. Accordingly, the state power is vested in three institutions: the 
executive, the legislature and the judiciary. There are several situations where the 
horizontal power sharing mechanism goes beyond this level and allows a dual power sharing 
system. This system establishes two institutions within one organ of the government. The 
dual executive system in Sri Lanka is an example. The Sri Lankan constitutional mechanism 
allows a dual executive system vesting the executive power in two layers: (a) the President 
and (b) the Prime Minister followed by the Cabinet of Ministers.390 Through this, the 
executive power is devolved to a certain level. However, this system does not ensure that 
the executive power is shared between local councils (vertical) which is fundamental to 
reconciliation. Rather, it allows the same horizontal power sharing principle - separation of 
powers - among the legislature, the executive and the judiciary.  
The vertical power sharing principle is a mechanism that allows executive power to 
be shared among different levels of the government. For instance, power vested in the 
executive is shared between the regional institutions allowing minority groups to access 
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national executive power. This method creates different layers in the government with 
executive power. For example, Lijphart’s proposal calls for a provincial government system 
with executive power in addition to the central government. Accordingly, Lijphart proposes 
that the national government should not be the only authority that enjoys executive power, 
but also, the provincial governments and local institutions. 
In Sri Lanka, regionalism is allowed by the establishment of the Provincial Councils 
under the 13th amendment. The problem with this mechanism is (as explained in the first 
section) that it restricts the power of the Provincial Councils to a large extent. Hence, for a 
successful mechanism these restrictions should be properly addressed. The third section to 
this chapter addresses these concerns.  
 
4.2. (C) Group Autonomy 
Multicultural societies often experience difficulties in state governance. The first 
section in this chapter demonstrated that implementation of proportional representation 
and executive power sharing tends to mitigate this difficulty to a certain extent. However, in 
deeply divided societies, despite proportionality and executive power, minority groups 
often experience violent treatment and injustice. Several incidents in Sri Lanka such as the 
2014 ‘Aluthgama’ incident and 2018 ‘Kandy’ incident are clear examples of his problem.  
In June 2014, a Sinhalese Buddhist group named ‘Bodu Bala Sena’ attacked a 
minority Muslim community in Aluthgama.391 As a result of this incident, 4 people died and 
80 others were severely injured.392 However, the government took little initiative to 
investigate and prosecute the responsible persons.393 A similar incident took place in Kandy 
in March 2018 where militant Buddhist mobs engaged in violent activities by beating up 
Muslims and destroying their houses, businesses and personal property.394 Sinhalese 
majority politicians were alleged to be behind the incident.395 However, the politicians have 
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not been taken to custody.396 
These incidents demonstrate that even with a strong minority representation in the 
national Parliament, justice is rarely provided to these groups. This is mainly because the 
majority community often undermines the values of the minority ethnic groups. As a 
solution to such problems, group autonomy should be implemented. Lijphart explains that 
this freedom may include the freedom to run their own internal affairs and may extend to 
different forms of self-government. It may result in a minority group separating from the 
national government to a certain extent and taking decisions for its own survival.397  
This principle was further examined by recent scholars. Robert Dahl is amongst 
them. He argued that, “no person is, in general, more likely than yourself to be a better 
judge of your own good or interest or to act to bring it about.”398 This means that, specific 
groups should run their own internal affairs since external groups cannot be ‘a better judge’ 
for their interests. Put simply, in Sri Lanka there are several ethnic groups including the 
Tamils and the Sinhalese. As per Dahl’s analysis, the Sinhalese cannot judge the interests of 
the Tamil groups and vice versa.  As a result, particular focus should be given to autonomy 
of the groups. Autonomy transfers the group identity to a commodity where the leaders of 
that particular group must compete to gain political power.399 For instance, Arabs in Israel, 
Muslims in Kashmir, Estonians in Russia and Malaysians in China seek to engage in politics as 
distinctive groups that have important collective interests.400 
In applying this principle to the (above) Aluthgama incident, it is clear that Muslim 
groups have an interest in the welfare of their own group. The Sinhalese majority 
government took little initiative to prosecute the responsible people. Yet, if a mechanism 
had been implemented with group autonomy, the Muslim group could have independently 
prosecuted the responsible people. Thus, it is clear that group autonomy is important to be 
implemented in a multicultural society. Implementing group autonomy in Sri Lanka is 
practically possible. This is because, the Sri Lankan legal system allows different legal 
systems according to different ethnic and cultural factors. For instance, Muslims have the 
different legal system of Shariah Law whilst the Tamils in the Jaffna region enjoying 
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Thesawalamai legal system (property law).  Also, Sinhalese in the Kandy region enjoy the 
Kandyan Law  
 
4.2 (D) Mutual Veto 
Even though the executive power is shared and some measure of autonomy is given 
to particular ethnic groups, sometimes the minority groups may not benefit sufficiently. 
Discrimination and killings of Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar and Rakhine Buddhists in 
Bangladesh are good examples of this problem.401 Buddhists being the majority, they acted 
at the expense of the minority Rohingya Muslims. Subsequently violence emerged in 
Myanmar despite Rohingya Muslims being recognised as a communal group, having 
proportional representation and the opportunity to participate in politics. As a result, for a 
successful power sharing mechanism, Lijphart proposes a fourth principle which is Mutual 
Veto. 
Mutual veto means requiring consensus of every group on major decisions taken by 
the majority ethnic group. In a heterogeneous society, where one major ethnic group rules 
over other ethnic groups, mutual veto plays a significant role in reconciling these 
communities. In this kind of situation, the majority must consider the opinion of the 
minority groups. If the minority decides the other way, the majority cannot proceed alone 
with their decision. As Lijphart proposes, mutual veto ensures political protection to 
vulnerable groups.402 Even though the concept of mutual veto is a historical principle that 
had also been discussed by Montesquieu and Madison, in a practical sense, this concept has 
been rarely tested. Only very occasional situations have established provisions for mutual 
veto. For the period of 1975 and 2010, only 11 states included specific provisions for mutual 
veto in their constitutions. This includes: Belgium, Bosnia–Herzegovina, Burundi, Canada, 
Cyprus, Iraq, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, Sudan, Yugoslavia.403 
However, Stephan Hall argues that Dagestan, a Republic of Russia, has successfully 
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implemented the mutual veto principle in its constitutional structure.404 In terms of Article 
81 of the Constitution of Dagestan, members of the legislature, the People’s Assembly have 
the ability to use a veto power if any legislation affects any ethnic group. This kind of a 
principle ensures that legislations passed does not negatively affect the existence of any 
other ethnic group. In 1956 the Sinhalese majority government lead by Prime Minister 
S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike enacted the Sinhalese Only Act. This is a discriminatory Act affecting 
the interest of the Tamil minority groups. However, there was no provision to defeat this 
Act. Under a system with mutual veto principle on place, if any statute of the Parliament 
negatively affects the status and key interests of another group, that group can veto the 
discriminatory statute. Subsequently, when the Sinhalese Only Act is implemented, the 
Tamil minority groups could have vetoed this Act. By this way, interests of the minority 
groups can be protected to a considerable extent.  
Summarising Lijphart’s proposal, proportional representation ensures that voting 
rights are given to distinctive groups and their representatives will represent their opinion in 
the legislature. For better enforcement of their rights, principles like autonomy and mutual 
veto should be implemented. In this way distinctive groups can make a stronger 
contribution to domestic politics. Now, the problem is whether these groups can have 
national level representation through these principles. Scholars like Dahl, Ian O’Flynn and 
Tom Hadden argue that having proportional representation, mutual veto and autonomy are 
necessary but not sufficient for power sharing. They propose some more elements amongst 
which intrinsic equality is prominent.  
 
4.2 (E) Intrinsic Equality 
Intrinsic equality is premised on the principle that everyone is equal because they 
naturally possess some rights and freedoms. These rights and freedoms are not external to 
human beings since they are naturally given. The Preamble of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights embodies this concept. It provides that, “whereas recognition of the inherent 
dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the 
foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.”405 This idea is originally derived 
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from John Locke’s Second Treatise of Government.406 Here Locke analyses that every 
man/woman has equal right to his/her natural freedom and that is not subject to the will or 
authority of another person.407 Locke analyses  that this natural freedom shall also include 
political power, where no other person can influence the political power without the 
consent of that person.408 The reason is that every person is intrinsically equal to each other 
and no one is intrinsically superior to any other.  
Put simply, take two Sri Lankan individuals; one Tamil and one Sinhalese. As per the 
notion of intrinsic equality both these individuals are given equal and inherent political 
rights. As a result, both of them can effectively participate in domestic politics and express 
their own political views. That does not stop there. The political interest of the Tamil 
individual is not subject to the political interest of the Sinhalese individual. Despite the 
interest of the Sinhalese’s political view, the Tamil individual can have his own political 
interest. For instance, if the Tamil individual wants to establish Tamil government through a 
free and fair election, the Sinhalese individual cannot intervene in his interest by stopping 
him from voting or facing an election. This is mainly because the notion of intrinsic equality 
takes the political interest of both of these individuals to the same level. 
Locke’s analysis does not specify intrinsic equality in terms of group or communal 
relations. However, legal and political scholars like Robert Dahl409 and Ian O’Flynn410 extend 
Locke’s analysis on intrinsic equality. Both of agree that intrinsic equality is displayed in the 
democratic processes when the principle of ‘equal consideration of interests’ is adhered 
to.411  
Now the question is whether intrinsic equality can be applied in group context. The 
large scholarship on human rights propose that application of individual rights for groups is 
a complicated question. Some scholars analysed that a right borne by a group is not 
essentially a human right attached to individuals.412 They also argue that group rights are 
potentially a threat to the individual rights. For instance, they claim that the reason why 
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human rights have been implemented is because individuals should be protected from 
specific groups.413 As opposed to this, some other scholars argue that human rights can 
apply in both individual and collective forms. They argue that human rights may de 
divergent from group rights but both of them are united by the same values.414 
The collective conception of Joseph Raz provides a reasonable justification on 
individual rights and collective rights.415 Raz analyses that to have a right is to have an 
interest and it conceptualizes others (who are external to that specific group) to have a 
duty.416 Both individuals and groups may hold rights under this concept. That is, when a 
group of people with joint interests provides a reasonable justification for them to have a 
right, others owe a duty against that group. Put simply, the Tamil minority group holds the 
interest of protecting their identity as a group. So does the Sinhalese ethnic group. Hence, 
others who are external to the specific group hold a duty for that group. For instance, the 
two groups are responsible for their counter groups. 
Accordingly, intrinsic equality can be applied to communal groups.417 Here, Locke’s 
definition for intrinsic equality (for person) should be applied to groups. In that sense; 
“every group has equal right to their natural freedom and that is not subject to the will or 
authority of another group.”418 When this principle is applied in the Sri Lankan context, 
neither the Tamil minority nor the Sinhalese majority is superior to the other. Rather, both 
groups have equal rights in the participation of politics and both the groups are equally 
recognised in the institutional and constitutional structure of Sri Lanka. Also, the principles 
suggested above (executive power sharing, autonomy and mutual veto) ensure that the 
power sharing mechanism is successfully implemented.  
Given these factors, power sharing is examined as an important concept in domestic 
governance. It satisfies the political and social needs of victims of the conflict. Implementing 
a power sharing mechanism would advance reconciliation in societies that are deeply 
divided on ethnic or social factors. The ideas put forward by Lijphart are important for 
power sharing. Executive power sharing and group autonomy in particular are essential 
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elements to mitigate ethnic violence.419  Also, power sharing requires the divided groups to 
jointly rule and make decisions by consensus. Hence autonomy is important. However, 
these principles are not sufficient for a successful power sharing mechanism. Hence, some 
recent additions to power sharing principles including intrinsic equality shall also be 
imposed in the Sri Lankan power sharing mechanism. 
 
Section III – Recommendations 
 The above analysis demonstrated that the Sri Lankan power sharing mechanism has 
some serious drawbacks. Some of the fundamental principles of power sharing have not 
been implemented in the Sri Lankan mechanism. Also, it gives prominence to one ethnic 
group causing structural violence. The Provincial Councils have limited powers and these 
powers have also been restricted by laws of the national Parliament. National Parliament 
also overrides legislation affecting the Provincial Councils without proper consultation of the 
Provincial Councils. Besides, the position of the Governor (for each province) acts like a 
watchdog of the national government and restricts the work of the Provincial Councils. For a 
successful power sharing mechanism that addresses the Sri Lankan reconciliation problem 
these weaknesses must be properly addressed. This section introduces three main 
recommendations that would help addressing these concerns: (a) appointing a Governor 
from the Provincial Councils, (b) implementation of a consultative committee to strengthen 
consensual decision making, and (c) implementation of a permanent minority seat for the 
minority Tamils in the government.  
These recommendations are derived from the principles laid out by Lijphart in his 
writings and adjusted to address the specific problems in the Sri Lankan power sharing 
system. First, appointing a Governor from the Provincial Councils allows Lijphart’s first 
power sharing principle, executive power sharing. As stated in the previous section, minority 
groups should be given the opportunity to appoint the members of their executive. Even 
though the existing mechanism in Sri Lanka allows such a process, the position of the 
Governor restricts this variable. To overcome this problem and to allow a strong power 
sharing principle this thesis recommends the appointment of the Governor from the 
Provincial governments. To allow mutual veto, this thesis proposes the implementation of a 
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consultative committee to strengthen the consensual decision making. As the previous 
section demonstrated, to allow strong power sharing consensual decision making is 
essential. The implementation of consultative committees allows this to happen. Third, 
implementation of a permanent minority seat for the Tamils in the government allows 
power sharing principles of executive power sharing, group autonomy, mutual veto and 
intrinsic equality. This chapter now turns to examine these recommendations.  
 
4.3. (a) Appoint a Governor from the Provincial Councils 
 Due to the reasons specified above in the first section to this chapter, it is clear that 
the President of the national government has full discretion to appoint a Governor of his 
choice and that leads to increased involvement of the President in the Provincial Councils.  
To avoid these weaknesses, it is recommended to adopt an alternative mechanism to 
appoint the Governor. In 2005, the Hindu – a prominent newspaper in India recommended 
an alternative mechanism for India which arguably would also be useful in Sri Lanka.420 The 
Hindu recommended the appointment of a Governor from the State Legislature (similar to 
Provincial Councils in Sri Lanka). Accordingly, people of each state should appoint 
candidates to their respective State Legislations. A Sub-Committee consisting of the Prime 
Minister of the national government and Chief-Minister of each province nominate three 
people from the State Legislature.  The Prime Minister and the Vice President of the 
national government make the final selection from the three nominees for the President to 
make the appointment. The whole process is subject to judicial review and the person 
appointed shall be an ‘eminent person’. This means that the person should have experience 
as a successful administrator, with some minimum educational qualification.421  
If this mechanism is implemented in Sri Lanka, it would mean that the President of 
the national government would have less influence in the Provincial Councils. In particular, 
the President would not have discretion in the selection of the Governor. Instead, the 
people will play a role in selecting a suitable candidate since it is the people who elect 
candidates to the Provincial Councils. Also, the Governor will come from the Province of his 
residence and not from any other province. Hence, the Governor’s autocratic appointments 
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from other provinces can be avoided. In this way, the Governor is not responsible to the 
President of the national government. Rather, the Governor is responsible to the people of 
the Provincial Council and to the Prime Minister and the Chief Minister of the Provincial 
Council. This mechanism can help address the problem of the Governor acting as a 
‘watchdog’ of the national government.  
 
4.3. (b) Implementation of consultative committees 
As examined in the first section, several ministries and institutions at the national 
and provincial levels have power in relation to the same subject matter. This leads to 
confusion between the national government and Provincial Councils. There is no system for 
consultation between the Provincial Councils and national government. Also, despite having 
some power sharing, the existing laws and regulations restrict independent and 
autonomous work by the Provincial Councils. Therefore, the Provincial Councils are largely 
ineffective. As a solution to this problem it is recommended to implement a consensual 
decision-making process between the national government and the provincial governments 
at least to the decisions affecting the provincial governments. 
The purpose of this process is to discuss the work of the national government and 
Provincial Councils to make decisions that affect Provincial Councils. This can be done by 
implementing a consultative committee for every Ministry of the Provincial Councils. The 
members of the consultative committee should be the Ministers of the Provincial Councils 
for that specific subject and the Minister of the national government who is responsible for 
that subject. Put simply, as examined elsewhere in this chapter, in every Provincial Council 
there is a Ministry for Agriculture. In the national government there is also a Ministry for 
agriculture. A consultative committee for agriculture should be implemented with the 
membership of the Minister for Agriculture in the national government and nine Provincial 
Council Ministers responsible for Agriculture. The chairman of the consultative committee 
should be held by the Minister of the national government and the Provincial Council 
Ministers should be the members of the committee.  
These consultative committees should be given certain duties and responsibilities 
affecting the projects of both the national government and Provincial Councils. Decisions of 
the national government, including cabinet papers, ministerial circulars and Parliamentary 
legislation should be presented at the consultative committee and get the opinion of the 
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Ministers of the Provincial Councils. Also, the Ministers of the Provincial Councils must 
discuss their plans with the Minster of the national government and Ministers representing 
other Provincial Councils. In this way, the national government and the Provincial Councils 
are aware of the work of each other’s work. That helps to address confusion in the 
government structure. Also, this method helps to use the consultative committees as a 
forum of providing information to the Ministers of the Provincial Councils. When the 
consultative committees have been implemented and the Ministers of the national 
government meet with the Ministers of the Provincial Councils on a regular basis, there is an 
opportunity for the Minister of the national government to inform them of decisions 
affecting the provincial governments. On the other hand, the national government is aware 
of the concerns of the people of the Provinces and effective solutions can be implemented 
to people’s problems.  
 
4.3. (c) Implementation of a permanent minority seat in the government  
The final recommendation is to implement a permanent minority seat in the national 
executive government. The Manning Devonshire constitution of Sri Lanka, which existed 
from 1924 to 1931, had given specific constitutional protection for minority ethnic groups 
by allowing a permanent minority seat in the legislature.422 Constitutional reforms after the 
Donoughmore reforms removed this provision, and members of the legislature were 
appointed by way of a general election. The proposed mechanism of implementing a 
permanent minority seat is similar to this provision, but extends it to the executive level. 
This means that the constitution allows Tamil minority groups to play a permanent role in 
the executive in addition to the legislature.  
As the second section to this chapter demonstrated, allowing the minority groups to 
access national executive power is fundamental to power sharing. However, this is rarely 
achieved with South Africa, Northern Ireland and Belgium as rare examples. For the purpose 
of reconciliation, it is recommended that a permanent minority Ministry be established in 
relation to Tamil affairs. For this, the South African model could be followed. As specified 
above every party who takes at least 5% of seats in the Parliament can represent the 
executive in South Africa. If this model is followed Tamil minority parties can have at least 2-
 
422 Department of Education Sri Lanka, History – Grade Ten Text Book (Sri Lankan Government Press 2000,) 29. 
 84 
3 seats. Accordingly, the individual representing the Tamils who takes the highest number of 
votes in the general election is proposed to be appointed as the Minister for this Ministry. In 
such terms, despite the political party or political interest of the government there is a 
permanent seat allocated to the minority group. In that way, any decision affecting the 
Tamil minority is taken by this Ministry. Since the person who takes the highest votes at the 
general election (from the Tamils) is appointed as the Minister, the political right of the 
Tamils to exercise power is ensured. Given that the Ministry is permanent (however the 
Minister is not), the appointee attempts to protect his Ministry by serving to the people to 
whom he was responsible. By way of a permanent minority seat in the executive, 
autonomous decisions affecting their ethnic identity can be taken. In the meantime, it also 
allows mutual veto, since the decisions affecting the Tamils taken in consultation with the 
proposed Ministry.  
 
Conclusion  
The Sri Lankan political situation does not allow the minority Tamil group to 
effectively participate in politics. Their political participation is minor, and their political 
demands have not been effectively addressed. One way of addressing this problem is 
through the implementation of an effective power sharing mechanism. The existing power 
sharing mechanism in Sri Lanka has some serious drawbacks. It has not accepted some 
fundamental principles of power sharing including executive power-sharing, group 
autonomy, mutual veto and intrinsic equality. Besides, some legal and practical restrictions 
have limited the existing mechanism. Governors of the Provincial Councils have a wide array 
of powers and acts as a ‘watch dog’ of the national government. The national government 
also enact statutes through the national Parliament restricting the powers of the Provincial 
Councils. Moreover, there is no consensual decision-making process between the national 
government and the Provincial Councils. Hence, people often experience serious difficulties. 
To avoid these weaknesses, three main recommendations are made. The first is to 
implement an alternative mechanism to appoint the governor in Provincial Councils. In this 
way the President’s influence over the Provincial Councils can be avoided. Implementation 
of consultative committees, the second recommendation, allows the two governments to 
discuss prior to decisions being taken. Confusion between policies can be avoided in this 
way. The third recommendation proposes the establishment of a permanent minority seat 
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in the executive. This recommendation will avoid the national governments decisions 
affecting the minority groups. 
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Chapter 5 
Economic reconstruction in Sri Lanka 
Introduction 
Post-conflict societies encounter severe economic problems.423 Any civil war tends 
to permanently affect the productivity and earnings of the individuals,424 thereby 
intensifying poverty and inequality in a given society.425 In post-conflict Sri Lanka, poverty, 
economic inequality and unemployment are rampant. These problems mainly affect the 
Tamil minority living in the war affected areas of the North and East of Sri Lanka. For 
instance, the Household Income and Expenditure Survey 2016 (most recent dataset) 
provides that the poverty rate (Headcount Index) in the Tamil dominated Eastern Province is 
at 7.3% and the Northern Province is at 7.7%.426 Compared to this, the poverty rate in the 
Sinhalese dominated Western Province remains at 1.7% and in the Southern Province at 
3.0%.427 Mulathivu, a war affected area, experiences a poverty rate of 28% whilst the 
national poverty rate remains at 6.7%.  
There are unequal economic conditions between the Sinhalese majority living in the 
non-war affected areas and Tamil minority living in the war affected areas. The Tamil 
minority in the war affected areas have fewer educational qualifications compared to the 
Sinhalese majority who have not been affected by war.428 As some reports issued in 2002 
and 2003 made clear, one out of three school aged children in the North and the East were 
not attending schools and during the civil war the government forces use the schools as 
military bases.429 The school aged children in 2003 are today of working age. Due to fewer 
education opportunities, these individuals have reduced capacity to engage in many 
occupations.  
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The overarching research aim of this thesis is to propose a successful reconciliation 
mechanism to Sri Lanka. Previous sections of this thesis introduced economic reconstruction 
as a principle element to establish a successful reconciliation mechanism. This chapter 
analyses the factors that restrict economic reconstruction and introduces a suite of 
governmental reform proposals that can be utilized to initiate economic reconstruction in 
Sri Lanka and thereby to achieve reconciliation. To address economic reconstruction, the 
causes of poverty, economic inequality and unemployment must be addressed. The first 
concern of this chapter is to identify the causes of the poverty, inequality and 
unemployment in the North and the East.  
First, after the end of the civil war, Sri Lankan society neglected and excluded ex-
Tamil Tiger members. As a result, ex-Tamil tiger members do not have access to 
employment opportunities and are economically disadvantaged. Second, the military 
remains suspicious of ex-Tamil Tiger members and tracks their movements. This restricts 
the ex-Tamil Tiger members from having access to employment opportunities, because 
employers are not willing to have military officials around their businesses. Third, disparities 
in education is a main reason for the lack of employment prospects of most of the Tamils in 
the war affected regions. Finally, persisting social norms discourage individuals from doing 
manual jobs and these are also often extremely poorly paid. 
After recognizing the reasons for poverty, inequality and unemployment in the North 
and the East of Sri Lanka, the second section analyses possible solutions. First, to tackle 
social exclusion, the establishment of the position of an anti-discrimination commissioner 
with appropriate laws is proposed. Unlike many other countries, Sri Lanka does not have an 
anti-discrimination commissioner. As a result, despite having some laws to fight 
discrimination, the enforcement of these laws is problematic. Second, the number of 
military personnel in the North and the East must be significantly reduced. This section 
demonstrates that the current military occupation in the North and the East of Sri Lanka is 
heavy and unnecessary. Reducing the number of military personnel from these areas can 
ease the military intervention in Tamil people’s lives. To address the larger problem of 
unemployment, the minority Tamils in the war affected areas should be included in the 
domestic economy. For this, the capabilities of individuals must be developed. Also, these 
individuals must be given credit facilities to encourage self-employment. In that way, they 
will be given the opportunity to put their capabilities into practice.  
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Official data related to most of the problems raised in this chapter is not available. 
Also, media and other news reports do not give sufficient attention to these problems. As a 
result, most of the information used in this chapter is based on personal communications, 
information shared through social media, and web information shared by the diaspora 
community. 
 
Section I –Reasons for poverty, inequality and unemployment 
5.1  (A) Social exclusion of the ex-Tamil tigers 
There is little information publicly available regarding the lives of former ex-Tamil 
tiger members. However, the social exclusion of the former Tamil Tigers is well known 
throughout the country.430 Social exclusion of the ex-Tamil tiger members results in 
increased unemployment. This is evident from the speech of the then opposition leader, R. 
Sampanthan to the Parliament on 27th May 2017.431 In this speech, Sampanthan 
emphasized that the North Eastern youth are excluded from having access to job 
opportunities. Most of the North Eastern youth were the members of the Tamil Tigers 
because the Tigers forced many children and youth to join them.432 
For example, there are claims that families of the female ex-Tigers are unwilling to 
accept them back.433 These families believe that there would be security issues for the rest 
of the family if the women joined their families again. Not only the families but also the 
whole society discriminates against female ex-Tigers. For instance, Jeya Kamalrajan, an 18-
year-old female ex-Tamil Tiger, explained that no one wants to offer her a job because she is 
an ex-Tiger member.434 Another 19-year-old ex-Tamil Tiger Nalini, mentioned that the 
society ‘distrusts her’ simply because she is an ex-Tiger member.435 For this reason, ex-Tamil 
Tigers experience difficulties in reintegrating with the society. The society simply refuses 
their presence and refuses to provide them with any employment opportunity. 
 
430 Home for Human Rights, ‘Female ex-combatants of Sri Lanka – Literature Review’, 2013 Home for Human 
Rights < https://www.scribd.com/document/212025604/Lit-review-Female-ex-combatants-of-Sri-Lanka> 1. 
431 R. Sampanthan, Unemployed Graduates; The Worst Affected are Tamil Youth’ (27th May 2017) Colombo 
Telegraph, <https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/unemployed-graduates-the-worst-affected-are-
tamil-youth/>. 
432 Human Rights Watch, ‘Living in Fear: Child Soldiers and the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka’ (2004) Human Rights 
Watch 16 (13), 4-7. 
433 Home for Human Right, above n 430. 
434 The Inside Story on Emergencies, Fewer “I do’s” for Former Female Rebels (23rd February 2011) The Inside 
Story on Emergencies, <http://www.irinnews.org/report/92017/sri-lanka-fewer-i-dos-former-female-rebels>. 
435 Ibid. 
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Such individuals who have been excluded from the society on occasions committed 
suicide. Indeed, some news reports indicate that the suicide rate after the war has 
significantly increased.436 Within the male ex-Tiger member group also, alcohol 
consumption has considerably risen.437  
 
5.1 (b) Military intervention in ex-Tamil Tigers’ lives 
Due to several reasons, military intervention in the North and the East resulted in 
increased unemployment and poverty. First, the Sri Lankan Army has taken over some jobs 
in construction and agriculture that are usually done by civilians. This restricts civilians 
having access to jobs. Military engagement in civilian duties is both a legal and a moral 
problem. Morally, military engagement in civilian work is not acceptable. Legally, s.23 of the 
Army Act of Sri Lanka authorizes the President of the country to allow military personnel to 
engage in civilian jobs when there is an immediate threat of deprivation of essentials to the 
people of Sri Lanka.438 In addition to this, s. 12 of the Public Security Ordinance allows the 
President to use the military to maintain public order when the police is inadequate.439 
However, the military has massively engaged in non-military work in the North and 
the East beyond these provisions. For instance, the 2015 Performance Report of the Sri 
Lanka army explains that several construction, reconstruction and earth work projects were 
undertaken by the Sri Lanka army.440 This includes an open-air theatre at the University of 
Moratuwa, a sports arena and merchandise building at Royal College, an indoor stadium at 
Sirimavo Bandaranyaka Vidyalaya, a railway restaurant at Diyathauyana park, and a 
renovation of the National Museum.441 The most affected are the minority Tamils in the 
North and the East. This is because, people in the North and the East usually undertake 
manual jobs including construction and agriculture due to their lack of skills. When the 
military undertakes construction projects, opportunities for these workers from the North 
and the East are restricted. On the other hand, engagement in these types of construction 
work are not ‘immediate threat of deprivation of essentials’ to be approved under the s. 23 
 
436 Daya Somasundaram, A Lost Generation of Tamil Youth (25th October 2015) The Sunday Times 
<http://www.sundaytimes.lk/151025/sunday-times-2/a-lost-generation-of-tamil-youth-169317.html>. 
437 Ibid. 
438 Army Act No 14. 1949 (Sri Lanka), Section 23. 
439 Public Security Ordinance 1947 (Sri Lanka), Section S.12 (1). 
440 Sri Lanka Army, ‘2015 Annual Performance Report’ (Annual Report, 2015) 12 -13. 
441 Ibid. 
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of the Army act. Hence, the military engagement in civilian jobs are legally and morally 
unjustifiable.  
Secondly, agriculture, which remains as a significant source of income for 
Northerners,442is restricted due to the increased military intervention. On the one hand, the 
Sri Lankan army runs and manages six large agricultural farms in the war affected areas.443 
This includes, Kandakadu farm, Manik farm, Nachchikuda farm, Udayarkattukulam farm and 
Yala Palatupana farm.444 As a result, opportunities for civilians to access agricultural jobs is 
limited. Furthermore, after the initial military capture of the North and the East from the 
Tamil Tigers in 2009, the military has not returned  large areas of land to their original 
owners. As a result, many individuals do not have land to commence or continue 
agriculture.  
An infographic issued by the Sri Lanka Campaign for Peace and Justice explains the 
extent to which the military has extended its work in civilians’ lives. This explains that the 
military owns a ferry service, 180-acre farm, 11 hotels, many restaurants, 2 whale watching 
trips, 2 airlines, 3 cricket stadiums and 1 golf course.445 This infographic describes that the 
military has taken over many civilian activities in the North. 
The government of Sri Lanka does not provide reliable statistics related to the 
military occupation in the North Eastern lands. However, several news reports have 
established that civilian lands in the North and the East to a large extent are still under the 
military occupation. The Tamil Guardian newspaper, for instance, revealed that 54,000 acres 
of private land in Jaffna is occupied by the military.446 People for Equality and Relief in Sri 
Lanka (PEARL), an NGO in the war affected area of Sri Lanka, in another news report 
mentioned that 30,000 acres of land in Mulativu area is under the hands of the military.447 
This report also mentioned that there is at least 1 soldier for every 2 civilians in Mulativu 
 
442 Department of Census and Statistics, ‘Sri Lanka Labour Demand Survey 2017’ (Survey, Ministry of National 
Policies and Economic Affairs, 2017). 
443 Human Rights Watch, above n 428.  
444 Ibid. 
445 Sri Lanka Campaign, The Sri Lankan Military Owns Sri Lanka Campaign for Peace & Justice 
<https://www.srilankacampaign.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/SRI_infographic_fig3_B-1-300x212.jpg>. 
446 Tamil Guardian, 5400 acres private land in Jaffna still under military occupation (4th July 2017)  
<https://www.tamilguardian.com/content/5400-acres-private-land-jaffna-still-under-military-occupation>. 
447 http://pearlaction.org/publication/normalising-the-abnormal-the-militarisation-of-mullaitivu-district/ 
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district.448 For this reason, people in the North Eastern Provinces do not have access to 
sufficient agricultural lands. 
Thirdly, there are claims that the government military track ex-Tamil Tigers. This has 
become a serious problem in Tamil society since it restricts the opportunity for these 
individuals to participate in socio-economic activities. The Sri Lankan government has 
undertaken several projects to rehabilitate ex-Tamil Tigers with the intention of socializing 
them to the Sri Lankan society.449 After rehabilitation, ex-Tamil Tigers must register with, 
and constantly report to, the Civil Affairs Office which is under the control of the 
government military.450 However, there is no legal authority or statute stipulating that the 
ex-Tiger members must report to the office in a given time frame.451 When these individuals 
are registered under the Civil Affairs Office and constantly reporting, the office keeps track 
of these individuals. Sometimes, the military maintains surveillance around the individuals. 
That reveals to the society that these individuals were once involved in the Tamil Tigers. For 
this reason, employers refuse to offer them employment opportunities because the 
employers are afraid that there would be subject to increased Sri Lankan government 
military intervention at the place of employment when ex-Tiger members are recruited. 
Some ex-Tamil Tigers have claimed that the Sri Lankan government forces treat 
them differently from other members of the society.452 Some social media posts shared by 
individuals claim that the Sri Lankan army often requests the national identity documents 
and sometimes questions them unexpectedly. However, similar situations do not exist in 
other parts of the country dominated by the Sinhalese. 
In support of this, Thisarani Santhirabose, a former Tiger member whose family lives 
in Canada, claims that it is difficult for her to do agricultural work due to discrimination by 
the military. She claims that her livelihood was agriculture and she often need to buy tools 
and equipment required for her livelihood. But whenever she visits the city to buy tools and 
equipment, she will be interrogated and questioned by the military.453 This is because the 
 
448 http://pearlaction.org/publication/normalising-the-abnormal-the-militarisation-of-mullaitivu-district/ 
449 Official records with reference to the rehabilitation projects are unavailable. 
450 Shamila, Female ex-combatants of LTTE in post-war Sri Lanka (24th February 2012) Ground Views 
<http://groundviews.org/2012/02/24/female-ex-combatants-of-ltte-in-post-war-sri-lanka/>. 
451 Ambika Satkunanathan, Jaffna and the Vanni today: The Reality beneath the rhetoric (17th March 2011) 
Ground Views <http://groundviews.org/2011/03/17/jaffna-and-the-vanni-today-the-reality-beneath-the-
rhetoric/>. 
452 Ibid. 
453 Personal communication to the author. 
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authorities know her to be a registered ex-combatant.454 For this reason, she often finds it 
difficult to buy the equipment. An anonymous interviewee mentioned that despite good 
education, her husband cannot get a job simply because “he was in the LTTE.”455  
 
5.1 (c) Disparities in Education 
Disparities in education is another reason for poverty, unemployment and inequality in 
the North and the East Sri Lanka. A report published in 2003 states that one third of school 
aged children in war zones in Sri Lanka have not been to a school. In support of this, Elroy 
Gabrielle, the former resident representative for UNICEF, in 2002 stated that one in five 
children in Sri Lankan war zones do not attend schools.456 TamilNet in 2002 has proven this 
by reporting that 150 schools in war zones had army camps established in them. Besides, 
the Tigers have used the children as soldiers. This is proven by a report issued by the Human 
Rights Watch in 2004.457 This report mentions that there were 3,516 new cases of recruiting 
child soldiers for the period from February 2002 to October 2004.458  
Each of these factors demonstrate that in the former war zones there were limited 
opportunities available for the school aged children to receive an education. From 2003 to 
2018, 15 years have passed and the school aged children in 2003 are now at a working age. 
Without education, it is highly unlikely for them to have many employment opportunities. 
This is one major reason for the youth in the war zones to have increased unemployment. 
Currently also, even after the end of the war, only some small initiatives were taken to 
improve education opportunities in the war affected areas.459  
 
454 The Economist, Thousands of victims of Sri Lanka’s civil war remain unaccounted for (16th March 2017) The 
Economist <https://www.economist.com/asia/2017/03/16/thousands-of-victims-of-sri-lankas-civil-war-
remain-unaccounted-for>. 
455 International Crisis Group, ‘Sri Lanka’s Conflict-affected Women: Dealing with the Legacy of War’ (Asia 
Report No 289. International Crisis Group, 28th July 2017) 
456 Avis Sri-Jayantha, Impact of War on Children in Sri Lanka (January 2003) Sangam 
<http://www.sangam.org/ANALYSIS/Children_1_28_03.htm>. 
457 Daya Somasundaram above n 436. 
458  Ibid, 3. 
459 For instance, Bandula Gunawardana, the then Minister for Education in the national government (2010-
2015), initiated a project named ‘Mahindodaya.’ Under this project the Ministry of Education aimed to develop 
the infrastructure in schools in Northern Province in 2014. However, this project has only selected schools 
grouped as 1AB and 1C. Accordingly, schools grouped as Type II and Type III have not been included under this 
project. Records indicate that in the Northern Province there are around 983 schools graded as Type II and 
Type III whilst there are only 196 schools graded as 1AB and 1C.  Amongst this 196 schools also, only 90 schools 
were selected to develop the infrastructure facilities. There are no statistics available with reference to the 
progress of the project. Even if it had been successful, only 46% of the schools in the 1AB and 1C grade 
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Due to disparities in education, economic reconstruction in the Northern Province has 
been restricted. Education increases the level of capability of individuals and that can help 
to make new employment opportunities. Given that the war has restricted children from 
having access to education opportunities and that the current allocation of funds for 
education in North Eastern provinces is low, individuals in the North Eastern regions lack 
required capabilities. This can be the reason for most of the war victims to be unemployed.  
 
5.1 (d) Persisting social norms 
Persisting social norms460 in Sri Lanka often undermine manual jobs and encourage 
people to search for administrative or general office work.461 As a result work in agriculture, 
fishing and animal husbandry in the school curriculum are not given prominence and are 
poorly paid.462 However, due to the war the Tamil minority in the North and the East have 
not had the opportunity for education. That restricts their opportunity of getting a white-
collar job which often require better education qualifications. For this reason, when 
members of the Tamil minority take manual jobs, the Sri Lankan society often undermines 
them.  
This social stratification is linked with the caste system in Sri Lanka which existed since it 
was a feudal society. At the time of the feudal system, different castes were given different 
occupations and only higher castes received top level jobs.463 When the Free Education 
Policy was implemented in 1945, lower caste people received the benefit of education 
which opened doors for better jobs. But over time the Sri Lankan social norms began to 
undermine the lower jobs. 
In the North and the East there are not many white-collar jobs available. As per the 
Labour Demand Survey Report (2017), out of 9,321 job vacancies available in the Northern 
Province, only 1,495 jobs belong to the administrative/ general office work.  All other 
occupations belong to some manual or agricultural jobs like sewing machine operators, 
 
Northern Province were benefitted whilst Type II and Type III schools have not been considered under the 
project. 
460 The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy defines social norms as ‘the informal rules that govern behaviour 
in groups and societies’ see Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Social Norms (24th September 2018) Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/social-norms/>.   
461 Lakshman, WD ‘A Holistic View of Youth Unemployment’, in ST Hettige and Mayer, M (eds) Sri Lankan  
Youth Challenges and Responses, Colombo: (Freidrich Ebert Stiftung Foundation, 2002), 13, 18.  
462 Ibid. 
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hand packers, cleaners etc. Comparatively, the number of white-collar/administrative and 
general office work in Western Province are high.464 For instance, occupations like systems 
analyst, bank tellers, civil engineers, office supervisors are available in Western Province but 
are not in the Northern Province.  
From these figures, two points can be identified. Firstly, the North and the East where 
Tamils live have high unemployment rates compared to other provinces. Secondly, out of 
the available jobs, the North and the East have more manual jobs and fewer white-collar 
jobs. The second point demonstrates that the Sinhalese majority has access to more white-
collar jobs than the Tamil minority. Thus, it is clear that the existing economic structure in 
Sri Lanka is not equal and does not allow equal opportunities for every citizen.   
To address the concerns raised in this section, the chapter now turns to examine the 
possible solutions that could effectively bring economic reconstruction to Sri Lanka. 
 
Section II – Addressing the Concerns 
5.2 (A) Enacting anti-discrimination laws  
 Ex-Tamil Tigers are socially and economically excluded and are less privileged 
compared to the Sinhalese majority.  Also, the Sinhalese majority government has made 
several discriminatory laws against them. These include the Sinhalese Only Act 1956 that 
made the Sinhalese language the official language of Sri Lanka and the provisions in the First 
republican Constitution 1972 which made Buddhism the official religion. These enactments 
resulted in the social and economic exclusion of the Tamils from Sri Lanka. To address this 
concern of social and economic exclusion, anti-discrimination laws should be enacted.  
Currently, the constitution of Sri Lanka prohibits discrimination against ‘race, 
religion, language, caste, sex, political opinion, place of birth or any such grounds.’465 
However, the constitution itself gives the foremost place to Buddhism and emphasizes it as 
the duty of the state to protect and foster Buddhism.466 This provision privileges the 
majority Sinhalese Buddhists and that is clearly discriminatory against the minority Tamils. 
For this reason, there is a confusion regarding the equality principle in Sri Lanka. Because, 
whilst one part of the Constitution giving priority for one religion, another part prohibits 
 
464 Department of Census and Statistics, ‘Sri Lanka Labour Demand Survey’ (Final Report, Ministry of National 
Policies and Economic Affairs Sri Lanka, 2017). 
465 Second Republican Constitution, 1978 (Sri Lanka) Article 12.  
466 Second Republican Constitution, 1978 (Sri Lanka) Article 9. 
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discrimination against religion and other grounds. This comes together with ethnic and 
racial discrimination because of the ethno-nationalism linked with Sinhalese-Buddhists and 
Tamil-Hindus. 
To address this problem, anti-discrimination laws on racial and religious grounds 
should be enacted. One model that follows such laws is Australia. In Australia, 
discrimination on the basis of age, disability status, race and sex are prohibited and has 
separate statutes for each of these categories.467 To ensure that these laws are enforced, 
the government established an independent statutory authority the Australian Human 
Rights Commission. Each state and territory also have anti-discrimination legislation and 
independent statutory enforcement bodies.468 Also, a formal complaint procedure for any 
incident exists. Comparatively, Sri Lanka does not have laws against discrimination. Hence, 
this chapter proposes the enactment of comprehensive anti-discrimination laws with the 
position of an independent anti-discrimination commissioner in Sri Lanka. 
 
5.2 (B) Reducing the military from the North and the East 
The next concern raised in this chapter is the increased military intervention in 
civilians’ lives in the North and the East. To address this concern, the government must take 
initiatives to remove army camps from the North and the East while releasing the lands to 
the Tamil people in these areas. This was requested by many political parties and interest 
groups from the government. In 2016, for instance, Sri Lanka Muslim Congress, a hardline 
main Muslim political party in Sri Lanka, requested the government to withdraw the army 
camps from the North and the East.469 The leader of the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress, Rauff 
Hakeem, further demanded that the properties which were occupied by the military must 
be given back to the people.470  
However, in a media statement released on 15th July 2018, the Sri Lanka Army 
declared that it would not close any army camp in the North.471 Controversially, President 
 
467 Age Discrimination Act 2004 (Cth); Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth); Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth). 
468Australian Federation Disability Organisation, <http://www.afdo.org.au/resources/state-anti-discrimination-
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469 Ians, Sri Lanka’s Islamic party calls for removing excess army camps from Northern areas (13th June 2016) 
First Post <https://www.firstpost.com/world/sri-lankas-islamic-party-calls-for-removing-excess-army-camps-
from-northern-areas-2832698.html>. 
470 Ibid. 
471 Colombo Page, Sri Lanka Army will not remove any army camps from North as rumoured (15th July 2018) 
Colombo Page News Desk <http://www.colombopage.com/archive_18B/Jul15_1531664582CH.php>. 
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Sirisena in November 2017 mentioned that the, “lands not needed for the three armed 
forces at present have already been returned to the people in the North and East, and in the 
future also more lands under those conditions will be released to the people.”472  
Under these circumstances, the most flexible method to resolve this issue is first to 
release the official records regarding the military occupation in the North and the East. 
Next, the government must release data as to what extent the military occupation in the 
North and the East is settled and the need of military occupation in the area. One soldier 
per two citizens is huge and that must substantially be decreased.  
 
5.2. (D). Development of the capabilities 
As explained above, economic reconstruction requires the generation of new income 
sources. Even though the government generates new income sources, if those sources do 
not match with the capabilities of people, these individuals do not have the opportunity to 
participate in these jobs. A study of child soldiers has shown, for example, that in Uganda 
male youth who were recruited to the military forces received less education which gave 
them no opportunity to join skilled jobs after the end of the civil war.473 This is the same 
situation that is happening in Sri Lanka: the victims of war do not have the opportunity to 
participate in the available jobs due to fewer capabilities. As a result, the economic 
reconstruction initiative is less effective. Hence, capabilities of the minority Tamils in the 
North and the East of Sri Lanka must be developed. 
 For example, Mulathivu is a war affected area in the Northern Province in Sri Lanka. 
People in this area have a low literacy rate since they did not have access to educational 
opportunities. If the government generates new employment opportunities which require 
the candidates to have higher education qualifications, Mulathivu residents will not benefit 
from such initiatives. Hence, despite having employment opportunities, unemployment 
rates will not be reduced. For this reason, the economic reconstruction mechanism must 
provide better education and training initiatives to develop the capabilities of the people.  
 
472 Tamil Guardian, Sri Lankan President – army camps will not be removed from North to affect national 
security (13th November 2017) Tamil Guardian <https://www.tamilguardian.com/content/sri-lankan-president-
army-camps-will-not-be-removed-north-affect-national-security>. 
473 Christopher Blattman and Jeannie Annan, ‘The Consequences of Child Soldiering’ (2007) 92 (4), The Review 
of Economics and Statistics 882-898. 
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The 2014 education reforms of France provide some examples of how this could be 
achieved. These reforms aimed at developing and securing career paths of individuals. For 
this, the government increased the investments of businesses that provided vocational 
training. These initiatives have widely accepted the right to training. As a result, individuals 
who seek employment were given access to some form of training to obtain a qualification. 
The responsibility of providing the training was vested in regional councils. Accordingly, the 
key players of training for the unemployed were the regional councils.474  
This system can be applied in Sri Lanka as well. Put simply, the 2017 Labour Report 
identifies that the highest number of occupations in the Northern Province are for Sewing 
Machine Operators (5,700 vacancies). Also, as per the latest data, the largest export 
industry in Sri Lanka is textile and clothing.475 The government expects to earn around 
US$8.5 billion by 2020 which is an increase of around US$3 billion from the current 
amount.476 When the Tamil minority in the war affected areas is able to participate in this 
economic activity, they will be benefitted in having better job prospects. As explained 
elsewhere in this thesis, economic development paves the way for reconciliation.  
 
5.2 (E). Provision of credit facilities 
When the capabilities of the individuals are developed with training and education 
opportunities, these individuals must be given the chance to commence their own business. 
This can be done by allowing credit facilities to the capable individuals. The large scholarship 
on economic development has demonstrated that allowing credit facilities can foster rural 
development.477  
 
474 European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training, France – 2014 – A year of reform for 
vocational education and lifelong learning (26th February 2015) European Centre for the Development of 
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Residents in the war affected areas often have difficulties in accessing credit 
facilities. Firstly, conditions implemented by banks and financial institutions can exclude 
them from obtaining credit facilities.478 Put simply, most of the banks in Sri Lanka require a 
minimum account balance to maintain a bank account. Some banks maintain a minimum 
balance of 1,000 Sri Lankan rupees which is more than what the people invest on food for 
about a week. Even though maintaining a bank account brings some advantages in terms of 
economic inclusion, rural villagers have to invest their own money just to open a bank 
account. This results in the exclusion of the poor from accessing the banking and finance 
services.479 
Secondly, financial institutions require specific identity requirements to access their 
service. This may also result in excluding the war victims from having access to credit 
facilities. Especially, after thirty years of war, people may not have access to their identity 
documents. Some documents may have been destroyed by the war. Also, some people may 
have not had the opportunity arrange their identity documents. For instance, if a mother in 
the war affected area gave birth to a child, she might not have had the opportunity to visit a 
government institution to do the necessary documentation to obtain a birth certificate. For 
this reason, most of the victims of war do not have access to identity documents. 
Due to these reasons, Sri Lanka does not offer many opportunities for the victims of 
war to access credit facilities. Hence, a successful model should be utilized. One of the most 
successful credit facilities was initiated by Mohammed Yunus to alleviate poverty. This 
project was initiated in 1976 initially as ‘Bank of the Poor’ and then as ‘Grameen (rural) 
bank’ microfinance system. Approximately 85% of the population in Bangladesh live in rural 
areas with less economic prospects.480 The premise of this project is not to provide 
individuals with a basic bank loan/credit facility, but to develop the human capital by 
prioritizing education, savings and technology.481 This project identified particular rural 
areas throughout Bangladesh and established a network of bank branches.482 Credit offices 
 
478 Raja Babu, Madhusudana Rao and Vissapragada Srinivas, ‘Performance of Rural Credit Schemes: Initiatives 
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Management, 9(3), 20. 
479 Ibid. 
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of these branches visit the designated area and make the villagers aware of the project. A 
group of five individuals who has a commitment to income-generation but does not have 
the opportunity of generating the income due to less capital are invested. The receivers of 
the loan are considered as members of the Grameen Bank project.483 It was expected that 
these members repay the loan from the income they generate from their new employment. 
They were given a six-week period to start repaying the loan which can be settled in 50 
weekly installments. This is a considerable time to start repaying the loan and sufficient for 
the members to repay the loan whilst being benefitted from the income they generate.  
The project displayed a number of benefits for the economy of the rural areas 
throughout Bangladesh. First, individuals who were suffering from poverty were given the 
opportunity to engage in economic activities. Because of this project, individuals who were 
working on average six days a month, increased it to an average of 18 days a month.484 The 
Grameen Bank project also helped increasing the daily agricultural wages by 30-40%.485 The 
contribution of these members to the household income was more than 50%.486 Within a 
short period of time, the members of this system were out of poverty.487 These members 
then focused on asset building. Grameen bank project supported the individuals who seek 
asset building by establishing a housing loan plans to the poor. This is due to the 
understanding that possessing a house results in increased productivity, due to storage and 
production. As a result, having a house as an asset results in the economic development of 
the poor. Simply providing a loan or a credit facility is not the focus of the Grameen Bank 
project. Rather, the project identified the particular capabilities of the individuals and 
helped them using their capabilities to invest on their future.  
When compared to the Sri Lankan case study, particular focus should be drawn to 
the idea that government loans, even though limited, were provided to the victims of war. 
However, in allocating these funds, unlike the Grameen bank project the government did 
not consider the purpose or the capability of the individual. This brought significant 
problems to the beneficiaries, the government and the institution that provided loan 
 
483 Mahabub Hossain ‘Credit for Alleviation of Rural Poverty: The Grameen Bank in Bangladesh’ (Research 
Report No. 65, International Food Polkicy Research Institute and Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies 
February 1988); Helen Todd, Women at the Center – Grameen Bank Borrowers After one Decade (The 
University Press Limited 1st ed. 1996). 
484 Ibid. 
485 Abu Elias Sarker, above n 480, 5. 
486 Ibid. 
487 No author, above n 481. 
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facilities. For instance, Sanmugam Sivalingam a victim of the Sri Lankan civil war in the 
Northern Province borrowed money to buy a taxi. However, the income he generates from 
taxi driving is less than the loan repayment amount. Hence, he experiences serious 
economic difficulties and often goes hungry.488 This simple example shows that in Sri Lanka 
a similar strategy like in Bangladesh have not been followed. The loan facility in Bangladesh 
Grameen Bank Project was allowed to the identified set of groups to invest on their 
capabilities. For this, specific evidence was required to demonstrate that the group of 
individuals have specific capabilities and invests money in the industry for which they have 
specific capabilities. 
As explained above, the government has given more focus on exporting clothing. If 
the government is successful in this policy, there will be an increased opportunity for sewing 
machine operators. The previous section has proposed the establishment of a mechanism 
to advance the capabilities of the individuals. Once the capabilities of the war victims are 
advanced, by allowing credit facilities these individuals have the opportunity to be self-
employed. This is because, with sufficient skills these individuals can buy sewing machines 
to contribute to the domestic economy. 
By addressing the above problems and by allowing the victims of war to have credit 
facilities, economic inclusion can be improved. Furthermore, allowing credit facilities can 
also address the problem of unemployment in the war affected areas. Put simply, the 
purpose of providing credit facilities is to support the poor communities who are interested 
in pursuing self-employment. The government has identified positions that are in high 
demand in each province.  In the Northern Province sewing machine operators are in highly 
demand. Also, there is a demand for agricultural products and fisheries. By providing credit 
facilities to support these sectors, new employment can be generated. In that way, the 
problem of unemployment can be addressed to a certain extent. 
 
Conclusion 
Currently Sri Lanka experiences serious economic difficulties related to poverty, 
unemployment and inequality. The most affected are the Tamil minorities in the North and 
the East of Sri Lanka. There are several reasons for the rise of poverty, unemployment and 
 
488 Jason Burke, Sri Lanka’s economic boom fails to erase painful civil war memories (9th October 2013)  The 
Guardian <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/08/sri-lanka-economic-boom-civil-war>.  
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inequality in these areas. Firstly, when the ex-Tamil Tigers rejoined the society, the society 
did not accept them or did not offer them employment opportunities. For this reason, ex-
Tamil Tigers started facing serious economic difficulties. Secondly, this situation developed 
when the military intervened in the lives of the ex-Tamil Tigers.  The government military 
kept tracking the movements of these individual with a suspicion that they will reorganize as 
Tiger members. For this reason, most of the employers refuse to offer them any 
employment opportunities since they do not wish to have increased military intervention 
within their place of employment.  
Next, the military also took many of the available jobs. Besides, the agricultural lands 
were occupied by the military. For these reasons, residents in the North and the East had 
very restricted opportunities to participate in jobs. Thirdly, due to the influence of war, the 
Tamil minority in the North and the East had very limited educational opportunities. Even 
after the war, the government’s focus on education in the North and the East is low. Hence, 
disparities in education is a considerable reason for poverty, unemployment and inequality 
in the North and the East of Sri Lanka. Finally, the persisting social norms that undermines 
the manual jobs and discourages the individuals from getting into those kinds of work. As a 
result, people use manual jobs as their last resort.  
To address these five main problems that restrict equal economic opportunities, 
specific solutions have been suggested in this chapter. First, to address the problem of social 
exclusion of the Tamil minorities anti-discrimination laws must be enacted. For this, the 
model that is being used in Australia can be utilized. Second, reducing the number of 
military personnel from the North and the East can help address the problem of increased 
military intervention in ex-Tamil-tigers’ lives. Next, by developing the capabilities of the 
individuals and by allowing suitable credit facilities, unemployment, poverty and inequality 
can be reduced.  
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 Chapter 6 – Concluding remarks 
 
Ethnic tension between the Sinhalese and Tamils led to three decades of a civil war 
in Sri Lanka.489 Despite the end of the civil war in 2009,490 ethnic violence still continues491 
and a successful reconciliation mechanism has not yet been put in place.492 Hence, there is a 
threat of recurrence of a civil war.493 The international community has suggested several 
mechanisms including a truth commission and a hybrid court to enable reconciliation in Sri 
Lanka.494 Hybrid courts are designed to bring retributive/ criminal justice to post conflict 
societies.495 In contrast, truth commissions mainly focus on restorative justice. Ultimately, 
both mechanisms are expected to work towards reconciling the divided communities in a 
post-conflict society. Both of these mechanisms offer some benefits to the transitional 
justice process. From being a therapeutic process to making a historical explanation of past 
incidents, truth commissions assist the transitional justice process.496 Hybrid courts are 
useful as a proximate justice system to the local population.497 The criminal justice system 
aims to deter future crimes. In addition to that, the benefits of both a domestic mechanism 
and an international investigation is offered by a hybrid court.  
The overarching research question of this thesis is to evaluate the extent to which 
the classical reconciliation mechanisms, such as international criminal courts and truth and 
reconciliation commissions, can be used to achieve reconciliation in Sri Lanka. Additionally, 
this thesis examined the possibilities for an additional mechanism to supplement the 
classical mechanism for reconciliation in order to better achieve reconciliation. The thesis 
does not propose to exclude any existing mechanism for reconciliation.  
 
489 Council on Foreign Relations, The Sri Lankan Conflict (15th September 2018) Council on Foreign Relations, < 
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491 Chapter 1 page 4 of this thesis. 
492492 The Indian Express, UN rapporteur unhappy over Sri Lanka’s reconciliation progress, (15th September 
2018) The Indian Express <https://indianexpress.com/article/world/un-rapporteur-unhappy-over-sri-lankas-
reconciliation-progress-4751007/>. 
493 Chapter 2 page 26 of this thesis. 
494 A/HRC/30/CRP.2, Report of the OHCHR Investigation on Sri Lanka, Human Rights Council, 30th Session, 
Agenda Item 2 
495 Chapter 3 page 45 of this thesis. 
496 Special Report 130, United States Institute of Peace, February 2005, 2. 
497 Chapter 3 page 46 of this thesis. 
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In answering the proposed research question, this thesis has identified that of the two 
forms of reconciliation, thick and thin reconciliation, the above-mentioned classical 
mechanisms such as hybrid courts and truth commissions only focus on thin 
reconciliation.498 Hence, despite these benefits, these mechanisms cannot achieve ‘thick 
reconciliation’ in a post-conflict society. Moreover, truth commissions, though intended to 
achieve restorative justice, do not focus on the problem of increased structural violence 
that results from protracted civil wars.499 Structural violence involves providing privileges to 
one communal group and detriments another.500 This causes antipathy within the detriment 
group. Also, the excessive time period taken by a truth commission can negatively affect 
reconciliation.501 Thus, these mechanisms are important but not sufficient to achieve 
reconciliation and these mechanisms should be supplemented by an alternative mechanism. 
For this reason, this thesis developed the hypothesis that, even though classical mechanisms 
are essential for the realisation of reconciliation, they alone will not be sufficient to achieve 
reconciliation in a post-conflict third world state. 
Thus, the context of the alternative mechanism is crucial. The majority of the 
contemporary conflicts take place in Third World countries. However, it is doubtful whether 
the contemporary reconciliation mechanisms represent a Third World perspective. One 
viable way of understanding the Third World people’s perspective on reconciliation is by 
analysing the Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL). From a TWAIL 
perspective, the key to addressing the reconciliation problem lies with addressing the main 
concerns of the victims that lead to the emergence of the conflict.502 This links with the 
notion of thick reconciliation.  
Thick reconciliation requires addressing the root cause of a conflict. Generally, 
conflicts tend to destroy the governing structure, rule of law and democracy in any given 
society.503 Hence, post-conflict societies continue to involve discrimination, marginalisation 
and rule-of-power. Moreover, conflicts often trigger poverty due to the scale of 
 
498 Chapter 1 page 6 of this thesis. 
499 Chapter 3 page 41 of this thesis. 
500 Chapter 2 page 25 of this thesis. 
501 Chapter 3 page 44 of this thesis. 
502 Chapter 2 page 20 of this thesis. 
503 UNICEF, The Impact of Conflict on Women and Girls in West and Central Africa and the UNICEF response. 
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infrastructure destruction.504 The existing political and institutional structure in these 
societies tends to be discriminative towards the minority groups. In particular, post-conflict 
societies tend to have a higher degree of structural violence owing to the particular social or 
institutional structures.505 Thus, thick reconciliation is required addressing the root cause of 
the conflict and the problem of structural violence.  
In answering the first overarching research question this thesis also suggested that, 
the classical reconciliation mechanisms have different aims, including peace building and 
trust building. These mechanisms have never considered mitigating structural violence as a 
common aim. Hence, classical mechanisms often disregard the actual problem that prevents 
reconciliation. This thesis has argued that to achieve reconciliation increased structural 
violence should be mitigated. For this reason, this thesis further developed the hypothesis 
that classical mechanisms are not sufficient for the realisation of reconciliation in a third 
world state.  
Given that the existing reconciliation mechanisms do not address structural violence, 
this research proposes an alternative mechanism. The proposed mechanism is only an 
additional mechanism and not a substitute for the traditional reconciliation mechanisms. 
The capabilities approach, a well-recognised social justice theory, suggests that increased 
structural violence should be addressed by introducing (a) increased political participation 
of the victims of the conflict and (b) increased inclusion of victims in the domestic economic 
process.506 In addition to these two requirements, the thesis proposes that the 
reconciliation should happen within a reasonable timeframe.507 Economic development, 
and political participation of the victims ensures the establishment of a social structure with 
equal opportunities for every individual. Timeliness is important because delay in the 
reconciliation mechanism will result in weakening the reconciliation process and might also 
result in conflict recurrence. Hence, this mechanism should put in place within a reasonable 
timeframe. 
The second research question developed in this thesis was to identify an additional 
mechanism that would supplement the classical mechanisms to achieve reconciliation in a 
 
504 Rubiana Chamarbagwala and Hilcias E Moran, ‘The Human Capital Consequences of Civil War: Evidence 
from Guatemala’ (2011) 94, Journal of Development Economics, 41, 42. 
505 Chapter 2 page 24 of this thesis. 
506 Chapter 2 page 30 of this thesis. 
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third world state. In terms of achieving thick reconciliation through mitigated structural 
violence, the thesis demonstrated certain structural factors that restrict reconciliation in Sri 
Lanka. Mainly, the Sri Lankan political situation does not allow minority groups to effectively 
participate in politics.508 Tamil political participation is minor, and their political demands 
have not been effectively addressed. In order to achieve thick reconciliation, Tamil 
minorities - who are heavily affected by the three decades of war and one decade of post-
conflict recovery - should be included in the domestic political processes. One viable way of 
addressing this problem is the implementation of an effective power sharing mechanism.  
The current constitutional provisions in Sri Lanka allow power sharing to a certain 
extent.509 However, this mechanism has some serious drawbacks. It has not accepted some 
fundamental principles of power sharing including executive power-sharing, group 
autonomy, mutual veto and intrinsic equality. Besides, some legal and practical restrictions 
have limited the existing power sharing mechanism. Governors of the Provincial Councils 
have a wide range of powers and act like watch dogs of the national government.510 The 
appointment of the Governor depends solely on the discretion of the Executive President of 
the national government. 511 Hence, the Governor tends to please the President by acting 
upon his orders. 512 National governments have also enacted statutes through the national 
Parliament restricting the powers of the Provincial Councils. 513 Moreover, there is no 
consensual decision-making process between the national government and the Provincial 
Councils. To avoid these weaknesses, three main recommendations are made. The first 
recommendation is to implement an alternative mechanism to appoint the governors in 
Provincial Councils. In this way President’s influence over the Provincial Councils can be 
avoided. Implementation of consultative committees, the second recommendation, allows 
the two levels of government to consult before making decisions. Confusion between 
policies can be avoided in this way. The third recommendation proposes the establishment 
of a permanent minority seat for the Tamil minority in the executive government. This 
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recommendation will avoid national governments’ decisions negatively impacted the 
minority groups. 
Economic inequality between the victims and non-victims of war results in increased 
structural violence. Tamil victims of the civil war who are the residents of Northern and 
Eastern provinces experience poverty, unemployment and inequality due to lack of job 
prospects, infrastructure development and lesser capabilities. 514 This thesis has identified 
several reasons that cause increased economic difficulties in these areas. One of the main 
concerns is the social exclusion of ex-Tamil Tigers at their return to the society. Simply, the 
society did not accept them or did not offer them employment opportunities when they 
rejoin the society.515 As a result, ex-Tamil Tigers experience economic difficulties. This was 
triggered when the military intervened in civilian activities.516  The military kept tracking the 
movements of these individuals because of a suspicion that they might reorganize as Tiger 
members. As a result, most employers refused to offer them job since they are not willing to 
have increased military intervention within their place of employment.  
Members of military took the civilian jobs and continued their occupation of 
agricultural lands, thereby extending the military intervention in civilian lives. As a result, 
victims of war in the North and the East have limited job opportunities. Due to the civil war, 
residents in the North and the East have limited opportunity to obtain a good education. In 
the post-conflict era also, the government had limited focus on education of the Tamil 
people in the Northern and Eastern provinces. As a result, there are disparities in education 
that cause poverty, unemployment and inequality in the North and the East of Sri Lanka. As 
a result, poverty rates have risen. Finally, the persisting social norms discourage individuals 
from obtaining manual jobs. 
The thesis proposes that the enactment of anti-discrimination laws could help to 
enhance social inclusion of Tamil minorities. To address the increased military intervention., 
this thesis proposes that the number of military personnel in the North and the East must 
be reduced. Furthermore, by providing adequate credit facilities and developing the 
capabilities of the victims, the problem of unemployment, poverty and inequality can be 
addressed.  
 
514 Home for Human Rights, ‘Female ex-combatants of Sri Lanka – Literature Review’, 2013 Home for Human 
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